

*Nietzsche: Unpublished Letters*. Translated and edited by KURT F. LEIDECKER. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959. Pp. 156.

The title of this book is interesting; but could it be meant to be taken seriously? The same consideration applies to the book itself. All of the letters have been published previously, some even in English. The editor offers his own selection of 75 items from Karl Schlechta's selection of 278 items in the third volume of Schlechta's recent edition of Nietzsche's *Werke in drei Bänden* (1954-56; for a brief critical discussion of that edition, see my *From Shakespeare to Existentialism*, Chapter 18, sec. 4). The idea of offering a slim volume of chronologically ordered Nietzsche letters to provide a highly concentrated portrait is intriguing, but the translations, though accurate much of the time, are so unreliable that one can never be sure, whether Nietzsche really said what he is here made to say. Those who do not know German may compare items 4, 30, and 75 with pp. 29f., 92, and 685ff. of *The Portable Nietzsche* (Viking Press).

There are no notes to explain allusions, nor does the editor supply the dates of all of Nietzsche's books to facilitate a better understanding of the letters. Seeing that in German Nietzsche's published letters comprise over a dozen volumes, it is odd that the editor should have confined himself entirely to Schlechta's selection of 278 items; and his selection of 75 from these poses further problems. The editor's claims in the preface regarding the significance of Schlechta's edition are completely untenable. It is simply false that "Nobody, of course, suspected anything until Professor Karl Schlechta" came along; and it is grossly misleading to say that the "machinations" of Nietzsche's sister "could have been discovered earlier had not readers of Nietzsche's works been so careless, hurried and superficial." Could have been? Were! Here the editor echoes *Time* magazine and the German *Spiegel*, whom one would not expect to have read the items by Bernoulli, Podach, and Steiner, listed in the bibliography of my *Nietzsche* (1950), or my own treatment of the sister, especially in the Prologue and in Chapters 1 and 10. Nor can and must future interpretations be based on Schlechta's edition. It offers but a small fraction of the literary remains published previously in the much more comprehensive editions of Nietzsche's works. Schlechta has changed the arrangement, but not the text, of the notes he offers, and no serious student can confine himself to a popular selection.

The oddest feature of the volume is the English of the preface. Nietzsche's personality was "aleatory"; something happened "during his unadumbrated lifetime"; "and what all does not ail man?" Many of the longer sentences cannot be construed; others, if construed, say what the author plainly did not mean. But let him have the final word: "Compare with Nietzsche's style. . . the style of books written then as now without regard to the niceties of language. Of course he, like ourselves, would be

pained to read them or lay them aside unread, being sensitive to language as to music."

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*Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge.* NIELS BOHR. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958. Pp. vii, 101.

This is a collection of speeches and writings of Bohr from 1932 to 1957. Concerned with epistemology, they show certain major problems facing the physicist during those years. As Bohr himself would be the first to admit, he is no Einstein in these discussions, yet makes a plausible case for subjectivist interpretations of modern physics. Questions may be raised, nevertheless, concerning his defense of complementarity and indeterminism.

The hypothesis of complementarity is not physical, but epistemological. By means of it one talks about concepts rather than physical events. What follows from complementarity is that one may admit realism on the macroscopic level while holding to subjectivism on the microscopic. The complementarity doctrine is not ontological; it is concerned with reports rather than things. Bohr states that with regard to atomic physics, "it may be stressed that the notion of an ultimate subject as well as conceptions like realism and idealism find no place in objective description . . ." (p. 79). But as a matter of fact, despite the assurances of Mach, the interpretations that we at present have *are* idealistic or realistic. That the interpretation of "objective descriptions" turns out to be philosophical (metascientific) is admitted by Born, Heisenberg, Reichenbach, Bunge, and others. Regret does not change the situation. Are we to be idealists on the microsystem level and realists on the macrosystem level, as Bohr seems to think we ought?

As a defender of the principle of complementarity in modern physics, Bohr generalizes to another region — life. Following certain views stressed by his eminent father, he holds that "it must be realized that the attitudes termed mechanistic and finalistic are not contradictory points of view, but rather exhibit a complementary relationship which is connected with our position as observers of nature" (p. 92). He further states on the next page that "we must recognize that *psychical experiences cannot be subjected to physical measurements* and that the very concept of volition does not refer to a generalization of a deterministic description, but from the outset points to characteristics of human life" (my italics, p. 93). It is likely that the subjectivist would see this, but it does not follow that the realist would, unless we define psychical experiences as "all experiences which cannot be measured."