

from the beginning are evidence of scale economies or processes protected by patents. Growth by merger suggests deliberate reduction of competition, but mergers are not inconsistent with important scale economies. General Motors and General Electric, to take two examples, are the products of mergers, but their success over a long period suggests large economies of scale. If the concentration level in an industry is due only to mergers, it is hard to understand why new firms do not enter in order to obtain some of the monopoly profits.

The work of Evely and Little points out important questions relating to the state of competition and to the causes of concentration in the United Kingdom which studies of individual industries might attempt to answer.

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NATANSON, MAURICE. *Literature, Philosophy, and the Social Sciences: Essays in Existentialism and Phenomenology*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1962. 220 pp. Guilders 18.

In the words of the author, Maurice Natanson, his book is, "A collection of . . . separately conceived articles . . . composed at different times for different sorts of audiences and, for the most part, . . . already . . . published. . . . There are repetitions, certain key terms are defined and defined again in various places, a few quotations reappear, and, beyond this, the essays are unequal in range, depth, and fundamental intent." After conceding all this on the first page of his Foreword, he adds, "But it is what brings these essays together that constitutes, I trust, their collective merit. Underlying the special arguments that are to be found in each of the chapters is a particular sense of reality, not a thesis or a theory but rather a way of seeing the world and of appreciating its texture and design."

If this should lead the reader to expect a high literary quality or an artistic unity, he is certain to be disappointed. The prose is highly academic and often very awkward; jargon proliferates, and the papers deal with the views of others to such an extent that no feeling for the texture of the world emerges. What existential unity there is comes from the author's abiding seriousness and, more obviously, from his devotion to Husserl's phenomenology and his interest in Sartre. He argues that "Sartre's inadequacies illuminate Husserl's achievements."

In the first six articles, the attempts to explain Husserl's and Sartre's philosophies overlap a great deal. They are learned and competent, but

will be of little help to those who are not already knowledgeable. Furthermore, they raise the question whether this collection is mainly intended for those interested in the author, or whether it is also useful for those concerned with the subject matter. Certainly, those who have previously come to respect Natanson's work should be grateful for this convenient and well-produced collection of his papers, but the reply to the second part of the question remains doubtful to the end.

The next four articles discuss phenomenology and existentialism in relation to the theory of literature; the following two treat specifically the work of Thomas Wolfe and Albert Camus. As a necrologue in the *Carolina Quarterly*, "Albert Camus: Death at the Meridian," may have been a pleasant enough piece, although it might have been ungracious to single out clichés or dubious pronouncements. Its reappearance in this volume, however, provokes the reflection that, like too much else of the content, these pages contribute little to our understanding of their subject. The papers on alienation, history, and death, in the last part of the book, are open to the same criticism.

On the first page of the first essay, a phrase from Husserl is quoted: ". . . the despair of one who has the misfortune to be in love with philosophy." Natanson himself speaks of being "existentially involved in philosophy," and goes on to charge "Anglo-American philosophy for the past half century" with "a root suspicion of commitment." Yet this volume does not make clear how phenomenology in general, and this author in particular, are "in love with philosophy," existentially involved in philosophy," and "committed" in a way in which Anglo-American philosophy is not. In this respect there is no difference between the majority of the papers written for academic journals and the minority contributed to more popular media. The promise of the passage quoted from the Foreword is not kept; the author's "particular sense of reality" remains in doubt. As it stands, the contrast of English-speaking philosophy with the tradition to which Natanson belongs remains one of several clichés in the volume that must strike as implausible all who did not accept it before encountering it here. But I want to close with an attempt at a constructive criticism.

Now that Natanson has cleared the decks by assembling in one place his old papers, he might try to work out, unhampered by the formidable obstacles enumerated at the beginning of his Foreword (quoted above), his own particular sense of reality. Instead of explaining Husserl to audiences that already know a great deal about Husserl, or dealing in a manner that is patently not wholly satisfactory with many other writers, he might develop his own views. If he succeeded

in doing this with a little more literary grace and without worrying quite so much about academic conventions that one with his "sense of reality" should hardly take quite so seriously, his next book would be worth waiting for.

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JONES, KATHLEEN, and SIDEBOTHAM, ROY. *Mental Hospitals at Work*. New York: The Humanities Press, Inc. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd.). 1962. 210 pp. \$6.

If it were not for the fact that *Mental Hospitals at Work* was published in the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction series founded by Karl Mannheim, it would hardly call for a review in a social science journal. Since it is written by a Lecturer in Social Administration and a Professor of Accountancy it would be unjust to expect it to offer sociological analysis where they do not pretend to bring this perspective to their study. Yet the authors' perceptive presentation of data, and the absence of sociological analysis, provide an opportunity for formulating some general observations in regard to hospital studies.

The authors' aim is to show that, in spite of the progressively declining number of mental hospital patients in England, mental hospitals are far from becoming superfluous. Rather than foreseeing a trend toward their abolition, the authors believe that "the right answer to the present controversy is for mental hospitals to become somewhat smaller in size, but for their work to become more intensive." They do not prove their point, however, as I hope to make clear.

Three hospitals are compared: Crown Lodge, with 300 to 400 patients; Moordale, of the same size, and Northtown with almost 3,000 patients. The first is a private hospital, the second, formerly private, is now under the National Health Act; Northtown, also now under the National Health Act, was founded as a county asylum in the mid-nineteenth century. In regard to treatment of patients, Crown Lodge is run on the principle of the "therapeutic community," that is, with much emphasis on group activities and with the additional use of drugs, shock, and individual therapy. At Northtown, treatment orientation is almost wholly organic, and at Moordale all schools of psychiatric thought are represented. Hence, the hospitals seem to differ significantly in regard to size as well as in regard to type of treatment. This difference is highlighted when we learn that at Northtown and