

traversing "the great Arabian Desert," as Paton has so justly described it. Ewing's commentary is too compact to satisfy even a beginner. Paton's monumental two volumes are too detailed. The interest of Kemp Smith's classic work in the historical problem of the *Critique* prevents the student from gaining an over-all view of the long and prolix argument of the Analytic.

Wolff's *Commentary* meets the insufficiencies of these works remarkably well. The author presents a strong case for the view that the Analytic from beginning to end is one closely reasoned argument that reaches its climax only in the Second Analogy where Kant justifies the principle of causality. The lucidity with which he describes this adventure is masterful.

In his introduction Wolff frames the questions which Kant undertook to answer. Beginning with Kant's pre-Critical writings, that worked within the problematic set up by Leibniz and Newton, he shows the transformation in viewpoint that Kant underwent by his exposure to Hume.

In his section on Kant's method, the author dwells upon the modes of logic employed by Kant in his arguments. He contrasts the synthetic method which Kant usually adopts in the Analytic with the analytic procedure of the *Prolegomena*. Wolff's observations here are extremely useful. They serve to explain the mysterious transitions and apparent backtracking of the Analytic, while at the same time they show the paramount importance of the transcendental unity of apperception in Kant's chain of argument.

The author then proceeds to a step-by-step analysis of the two deductions. Faced with the problem of explaining the development of Kant's thought through the two editions, he provides schematic outlines of four successive versions of the argument at the end of each section in his discussion. This is certainly one of the most valuable features of Wolff's book. These schemas clearly isolate the premisses and put into logical progression material that is often misplaced in the actual text from what we would expect to be its natural sequence.

After short discussions of the Schematism and the First Analogy, the author moves on the Second Analogy (causality), which he treats as the real kernel of the Analytic. Wolff shows that Kant's definition of synthesis is stated in merely general terms in the deductions and needs the Second Analogy for adequate development. Wolff then recasts the four preliminary arguments in a fifth and final schema. Beginning with the unity of apperception and the temporal character of perception as his two premisses, he deduces the existence of a mental synthesis stated in terms equivalent to the principle of causality.

In interpreting the five arguments of the Analytic, Wolff employs three chief guidelines. First, Kant develops his doctrine by taking the "epistemological turn," rejecting the attempts of earlier subjectivists to pass beyond their ideas to some kind of metaphysical statement about the reality beyond. Kant seeks the characteristics and bases of the *knowledge* of objects, rather than the characteristics of the objects in themselves. Secondly, Kant characterizes the knowledge of objects by the modes of necessity and universality. Finally, Kant grounds these characteristics by a dynamic analysis of the cognitive act; the mind, in its functioning, must conform to innate rules that govern the association of mental images. The author's discussion of Kant's notion of "rule" is probably the most illuminating section of his whole commentary.

While the author does not gloss over the difficulties of Kant's text, the reader sometimes feels that Wolff sees logic and neatness in Kant's argument where there is none. This minor defect detracts but little, however, from the immense service which the author has done for the student of the *Critique*.

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Young Nietzsche and the Wagnerian Experience. By Frederick R. Love. (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1963. Pp. xi + 103.)

Professor Love's little book differs from previous studies of Nietzsche's relation to Wagner by taking into account Nietzsche's compositions, including unpublished items in the

Nietzsche archives in Weimar.¹ The author visited the archives, which are now housed with the Goethe and Schiller archives, in the summer of 1959. He also makes good use of the *Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe* of Nietzsche's *Werke* and *Briefe*. While both the five volumes of "works" and the four of letters stop short of Nietzsche's first book, which was published in 1872 when he was 27—the edition is chronologically arranged, and publication was discontinued during World War II—these volumes are obviously valuable for a study of the young Nietzsche. The book abounds in German quotations from the *Gesamtausgabe*, all untranslated.

The author argues plausibly that Nietzsche never was "a passionate devotee of Wagnerian music" (p. viii). He takes issue with Nietzsche's own testimony in *Ecce Homo*: "From the moment when there was a piano score of *Tristan*—my compliments, Herr von Bülow!—I was a Wagnerian." This would take us back to the spring of 1861 when Nietzsche was 16. Yet Love later concedes that in one of Nietzsche's compositions, dated June 1861, the text "included an unmistakable token of the proximity of *Tristan und Isolde*: 'Wild wogt der Wahn, wo durch bewegt, das Wunder wollend mein Gemüth? [sic]'" (p. 22). Still, Love (the parenthetic "sic" is his) argues his point convincingly. He points to Nietzsche's abiding love for older masters, throughout this period; he considers Nietzsche's Lieder, written between 1862 and 1865, and finds "nothing whatever Wagnerian" in them (p. 28); he quotes from relevant letters; and he characterizes "Nietzsche's attitude toward Wagner and the moderns during this early period... as a playful eclecticism.... His most active concern with the Wagnerian idiom coincided in time with a marked reserve in his overall enthusiasm for Wagner's work—as contrasted with [his close friend] Gustav Krug's missionary fervor—and the sporadic indulgences in 'futuristic' techniques in the later phase were at best tongue-in-cheek obeisances.... His true sympathies clearly lay elsewhere..." (p. 30).

In the winter 1865-66, as a student in Leipzig, Nietzsche wrote in a letter: "Three things are my recreations, but rare recreations, my Schopenhauer, Schumann music, finally long walks." And in a list he made of "musical *mignonnes*" at that time, Schumann, Beethoven, and Schubert are most prominent; "two choral works of Bach are mentioned, 'ein paar' Lieder of Brahms, and of Wagner only the early opera *Tannhäuser*, listed indiscriminately next to a work by Meyerbeer" (p. 35).

Chapter IV shows equally convincingly that Nietzsche was far from accepting Schopenhauer's philosophy, much as he admired Schopenhauer. Chapter V shows how Nietzsche was evidently more impressed when he first heard *Die Meistersinger* in 1868 than he had been by *Tristan* in 1861. In November, 1868, he met Wagner whom he subsequently visited 22 times in Tribschen near Lucerne. That this friendship meant a great deal to Nietzsche is undeniable, and Love does not try to belittle it. But he observes, rightly, that it encouraged Nietzsche "to continue wearing the garb of a Schopenhauerian" (p. 62) because Wagner's philosophical interests were concentrated on Schopenhauer: in fact, Nietzsche's meditation on *Schopenhauer as Educator* (1874), though "written in good faith as a grateful portrayal... is clearly a projection of Nietzsche himself..." (p. 63).

One might add that Nietzsche was quite right when he said of *The Birth of Tragedy*, in *Ecce Homo*, that "it is only in a few formulas affected by the cadaverous perfume of Schopenhauer": even his first book represents a declaration of independence from Schopenhauer's world view; it celebrates tragedy as a magnificent and vastly preferable alternative to Schopenhauer's "Buddhistic negation of the will" (*Birth*, section 7). Tragedy, according to Nietzsche, faces the horrors of existence as boldly as Schopenhauer did (and Nietzsche admired Schopenhauer for this honesty), but tragedy, unlike Schopenhauer, affirms life and this world as beautiful in spite of everything. The portrait of Schopenhauer in the "untimely meditation," two years later, is not offered as a contribution to the history of philosophy: Nietzsche makes it quite plain in the first section that the question to be considered is rather how a man might "follow his conscience which shouts at him: 'Be yourself! You are not really all that which you do, think, and desire now.'" To discover "your true self [which]

¹ Some of Nietzsche's compositions have been published: *Lieder für eine Singstimme, mit Klavierbegleitung* (Leipzig, Kistner & Siegel, 1924), edited and with postscript by Georg Göhler.

does not lie deeply concealed within you but immeasurably high above... what you usually take for your ego," you might ask yourself: "What have you really loved till now?" The allegedly Schopenhauerian traits, then, that the young Nietzsche goes on to describe so lovingly are plainly offered as a portrait of that self which the young author himself would like to realize one day. This excursus goes beyond Love's book but is entirely consistent with it.

To return to Love: "As for Wagner's music, it can be stated unequivocally that *Die Meistersinger* was the only one of the mature works which Nietzsche acquired fully on his own and the one which he knew best from actual performance" (p. 63). *Tristan* he heard only twice, in June 1872, in Munich where "Hans von Bülow gave the European musical public its second chance to experience a production of *Tristan*" (p. 64). Love thinks that *Tristan* "became for Nietzsche the permanent symbol of his unforgettable Tribschen experience" because "Wagner himself must have opened his mind to the deeper meaning of his most radical work" (p. 65).

Though Love does not mention this, the tribute to von Bülow in *Ecce Homo*, quoted above, evidently conflates two events, the one in 1861 to which Nietzsche refers, the other in 1872. Incidentally, Love refers to (p. 69) but does not quote von Bülow's scathing letter to Nietzsche about one of Nietzsche's compositions. Nietzsche himself refers to this letter in *Ecce Homo* and mentions that von Bülow had accused him of "rape of Euterpe." It is doubly noteworthy that he went out of his way to voice his gratitude to von Bülow.

Nietzsche's last composition, says Love, was a Hymn on Friendship (1873): his music for Lou Salomé's Hymn on Life, published in 1886 and mentioned in *Ecce Homo*, was based on the chorale of the earlier hymn. Neither version could be called Wagnerian. Indeed, looking back over his compositions in 1874, Nietzsche himself commented "how in music the unalterability of character is revealed," for "he had once again returned, after a brief struggle... to the area of his natural inspiration... in what amounted to a reaffirmation of the consistency of his musical character." And Love concludes that "Nietzsche's infatuation with Wagnerian music... may indeed be regarded as an aberration."

The notion, long popular in some circles, that Nietzsche betrayed himself when he left Wagner and began to write aphorisms, is certainly fantastic. It has long been obvious that Nietzsche had to break with Wagner or give up his own work. The composer, born in 1813 like Nietzsche's deceased father, appreciated the young professor as a welcome apostle and as a friend who could be asked to do one's Christmas shopping. Wagner asked for changes in the final sections of *The Birth* and the meditation on Schopenhauer, and he regretted the absence of any reference to himself in the meditation on history. Moreover, Nietzsche had misgivings about Wagner's hatred of the French and the Jews, discounted these eccentricities as long as his fascinating friend lived a lonely life in Switzerland, but had to take a stand when Wagner moved to Bayreuth and became a major influence in the new German Empire.

Love does not include a study of Nietzsche's break with Wagner, but there was no need of that. By showing how Nietzsche never was "a passionate devotee of Wagnerian music," Love adds some pertinent information. In sum, this solid and unpretentious little book rounds out the picture previously available by showing that Nietzsche's musical compositions and tastes are consistent with the conclusions to which one is driven when investigating his intellectual and stylistic development.

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Die Philosophie Westeuropas im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert. By Hermann Noack. (Basel/Stuttgart, Benno Schwabe & Co., 1962. Pp. 370.)

This volume forms an introduction to a series of books entitled *Die philosophischen Bemühungen des 20. Jahrhunderts* (The philosophical efforts of the twentieth century). The introduction is supposed to provide for the reader a general orientation of the over-all trends