

determine to alter a habit of action (see 8.320). It is easy to see that no one of these features is necessary for every case of self-control. Similiar difficulties arise if one says, with Peirce, that thought is internal dialogue, that thought requires a multiplicity of selves in one, that "to call an argument illogical . . . is a special kind of moral judgment" (8.191), and so on. Bernstein's major criticism of Peirce is that he does not have an adequate theory of the self.

In "Community and Reality" John E. Smith objects to Peirce's account of reality as the object of ultimately stable scientific opinion. Smith seems to think that Peirce intended an identification of what is real with fated *opinion*. But surely there is ample evidence that Peirce held that what is real is the *object* of stable scientific truth or fated opinion? Of course there is no answer to Smith's charge that the real cannot be defined in terms of future, and therefore only *possible*, experience unless there is a distinction between what is or exists and what is real or genuine. Perhaps Peirce failed to give sufficient attention to this distinction. Smith also objects that "the present integrity of the real individual is lost if . . . reality is identified with an opinion or type of experience that never manages to establish itself in the present" (p. 118). Reference to "the present integrity" and "real individual" here certainly sounds question-begging, for in Peirce's picture of things persons enjoy no such integrity and reality.

Paul Weiss, in "Charles S. Peirce, Philosopher," lists and discusses what he believes are Peirce's achievements and failures as a philosopher. Weiss's "Biography of Charles Sanders Peirce" contains a most startling fact about this most extraordinary philosopher: "He could . . . write with both hands—in fact, he was capable of writing a question with one hand and the answer simultaneously with the other" (p. 9).

On page 116, line 23, "progress" should probably be "process."

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HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY: DIALOGUES ON THE LIFE OF MIND. By J. LOEWENBERG. La Salle, Ill., The Open Court Publishing Co., 1965. Pp. xv, 377. \$12.50.

For a generation after the death of Royce in 1916, Professor Loewenberg was widely considered the dean of American Hegel scholars. He kept teaching seminars on Hegel's *Phenomenology* while Hegel was in eclipse in the English-speaking world, and most American

BOOK REVIEWS

philosophers knew of these seminars, but not what Loewenberg might have to say about Hegel. In his introduction to his *Hegel Selections* (1929) Loewenberg suggested implausibly that Hegel had been one of humanity's greatest comic geniuses. His editing was open to many objections, but there was no other Hegel anthology, and thousands of students were introduced to Hegel by his. In 1934 and 1935 Loewenberg published two articles on Hegel in *Mind*, the second of them another attempt to find "Comedy . . . in Hegel's *Phenomenology*." For a full-length study, however, we had to wait until 1965 when Loewenberg, at 83, finally published the volume under review here.

The value of the book is twofold. First, it fills a gap in our knowledge of the reception of Hegel in America by telling us what the generations of students in Loewenberg's Hegel seminars at the University of California, Harvard, Columbia, and Haverford, to whom this volume is dedicated, were taught. Second, there are few works in English that devote much space to the *Phenomenology*, and readers perplexed by difficult passages will surely want to turn to Loewenberg, too. His play-by-play discussion, reminiscent of Kuno Fischer's coverage of the whole of Hegel in two volumes (1901) and, of course, of Royce's three chapters on the *Phenomenology* in the posthumous *Lectures on Modern Idealism* (1919), can be counted on to help students here and there.

Yet the book has several pervasive faults that spell disappointment. Above all, it remains unclear throughout to whom it is addressed. We are told about ten times that "a critical examination of the text, a task devolving upon the learned commentators, is thus not to be looked for in the following quasi-lay conversations" and that—still quoting from the preface—we should resign ourselves to "a discussion free of exegesis. . . . There are no footnotes." Neither are there any page references or discussions of previous interpretations. "Our lay undertaking, seeking to make Hegel's 'caviare to the general' generally palatable, can of course not compete with the exegetical labors of the learned" (p. 20; cf. pp. 42, 78, 105, 298, 305). Again and again, the author dissociates himself from "specialists" and "scholars" and "commentators" to insist that his study is "nonprofessional." Nor is he concerned with the place of the *Phenomenology* in Hegel's thought: "The relation of the *Phenomenology* to the *Logic* presents a special problem to the specialists. Let them settle the question" (p. 360). In the end, this theme is sounded once more on the last page but one, with the comment: "By the learned our opinions will be adjudged superficial and by the uninitiated recondite" (p. 370). That, of course, is the trouble.

The whole discussion is presented in the form of a dialogue between Hardith and Meredy, but these two men do not emerge as distinct characters, and the author has no ear whatever for the spoken language. The following two examples from the middle of the book could be supplemented indefinitely. "*Hardith*: What a punster Hegel is! A compilation of the word-plays dispersed through the text would prove, serving though they do to drive home a crucial point, that not all are equally felicitous" (p. 166; surely the last statement is true of all works containing many plays on words). Two pages later Meredy says: "'The kingdom of the spiritual animals,' as Hegel partly entitles the section, exhibits when viewed at close range unrivalled opportunities for comic laughter." Could anyone really laugh, comically or otherwise, while grappling with the extreme opacity of the original text? J. B. Baillie mistranslated the title of the section quite badly in two different ways in the first and second editions of his translation of the *Phenomenology*, and Loewenberg's rendering leaves much to be desired, too: "The animal kingdom of the spirit and deception, or devotion to the cause" would be far better and might even help to suggest that Loewenberg's reading of this section, like Royce's on which it is based, is much too narrow.

Since Hardith and Meredy speak in the same voice, the primary function of the dialogical form in this book is to allow for such phrases as Hardith's "The clarity with which you are able to paraphrase Hegel's thought has my unstinted admiration" (p. 9) and Meredy's "What a clever pun! And how admirable a gist of Hegel's technical argument!" (p. 144). The term "admirable" recurs frequently (e.g., pp. 32, 90, 236, 251, 304—three times Meredy, twice Hardith). Elsewhere the author tells us how "felicitous" his phrases are (pp. 43, 88, 197, 200, 251, 320—again using both characters). And similar locutions abound—for example, "How often you manage to phrase the central issue in simple and concise language! Once again you have hit the nail on the head" (p. 212; cf. pp. 77, 109, 151, 170, 221, 269, 271).

One may question whether these lavish tributes are deserved; perhaps even whether, in view of the author's self-imposed limitations and his deliberate disdain of detail and of a scholarly approach, they could possibly be deserved. The key concepts of the *Phenomenology*—for example, *Phänomenologie*, *Geist*, *Begriff*, *Bildung*, *sittlich*—are never discussed adequately. The brief mention of the problem whether *Geist* should be rendered by "mind" or "spirit" provides little illumination: "Which of the English equivalents is the more comprehensive

noun? Is spirit a species of mind or vice versa? Fortunately, this is a linguistic point of but minor importance which only the punctilious are apt to raise" (p. 186). It may not be fruitful to raise it in this form, but from a book this size about Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* one would expect some illumination about the meaning of *Geist*. This might involve some attention to the uses of that term by Hegel's predecessors and contemporaries or to Hegel's other writings, both earlier and later—but Hardith's and Meredy's dialogue is totally oblivious both of the historical context of the book they are discussing and of Hegel's other works.

Loewenberg's lack of interest in Hegel's philosophical enterprise as a whole also finds expression in his slighting of Hegel's celebrated preface (91 pages in the original edition). Rudolf Haym said in 1857 that "anyone understands Hegel's philosophy if he completely masters the meaning of this preface," and many Hegel scholars have hailed it as probably Hegel's masterpiece. But Loewenberg accords the preface less than seven exceedingly slight pages that do not begin to give the reader an idea of its contents and significance.

What of Hegel's method? Loewenberg continually speaks of Hegel's "puns," although in most cases what he is referring to are not puns in any strict sense of that word at all. Hegel claims to find insights embodied in language. More important, the book ends by suggesting on its last page that the end of the *Phenomenology*—and of Hegel's other books, it would seem—contradicts the dialectical method; for "the method itself can attain no end, whether in a sense temporal or non-temporal, simply because the law under which it operates demands that any result produce by an immanent process its own opposite." But does "the law" demand this? How does Meredy know this? To be certain, he would surely have to see what Hegel himself says about the dialectic both in this work (especially in the preface) and in the *Logic* and in his later works; how he actually employs his dialectic; and perhaps even what others—Findlay, for example—have said about this question.

In the absence of any such effort, this book is certainly not the "definitive" work on the *Phenomenology* which the publisher twice says on the jacket it is. But the publisher has produced the book beautifully, printing it very pleasingly on exceptionally good paper; and the photograph of the author on the front of the jacket is superb.

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