

This book is my intellectual grandchild. It has other ancestors, and I have other offspring, but I am proud of it without always agreeing with it. And, of course, it does not always agree with me.

The book's father, Ivan Soll, majored in philosophy at Princeton, and after a year's graduate work at Harvard and another year on a Fulbright at Munich he returned to Princeton for his doctorate. He wrote both his B.A. thesis (on Sartre) and his Ph.D. dissertation (on Hegel) with me, but by the time he completed the latter he was teaching at The University of Wisconsin—Hegel among other subjects. And since he got his degree he has done further work on Hegel, some of it in Paris where he spent a leave of absence.

Our approaches to Hegel are similar in many ways—above all, sympathetic and critical at the same time. But Soll deals with problems that are not discussed in comparable detail in my *Hegel*, and his orientation is less historical than mine.

My book aimed to show how Hegel and his philosophy were very different from the prevalent conceptions of the man and his system. Hegel's personality and development, the nature and aim of his *Phenomenology*, his *Logic*, and his system, and his attitude toward history were moved into the center. Balancing this concern with the whole phenomenon of Hegel, my commentary on the long preface to the *Phenomenology* involved some more microscopic work. My hope was to make a new beginning and to lay the foundations for further studies.

Good monographs on Hegel's aesthetics and his political philosophy, his philosophy of religion and his philosophy of nature are still sorely needed. Hegel's metaphysics is easily as important as any of these subjects, the more so because he has so often been seen as above all a metaphysician, if not the arch-metaphysician of all time. There is thus a special need for the present *Introduction*.

Soll's Hegel is a metaphysician, but not a proponent of the kind of metaphysics that was associated with his name during the heyday and in the wake of British Idealism. The Hegel encountered in the following pages is concerned with the relation of truth to human activity, with Kant's thing-in-itself, with subjectivity and objectivity, and with what Hegelians call the good and the bad infinite.

In one important respect this book stands in the tradition of Anglo-American Hegel scholarship. It is not an essay in the history of ideas, and there is little concern with influences or comparisons. Thus Royce's conception of Hegel's relation to pragmatism is criticized in these pages, but Dewey's debt to Hegel is not discussed. But anyone interested in that question is sure to find Soll's study extremely helpful.

In the second chapter, where Hegel's rejection of Kant's thing-in-itself is discussed, the treatment of the same problem by Fichte, Schelling, and Schopenhauer is not brought in. Soll's central aim, of which he never loses sight, is to show how Hegel dealt with some fundamental problems that continue to be of great interest to philosophers. In this way important questions are opened up in a fruitful manner that invites further reflection and research.

The style is exceptionally clear and straightforward, unencumbered both by Hegelian jargon and by current fads. Rarely have such metaphysical complexities been treated with such lucidity. This is a welcome departure from the tradition of paraphrasing obscure texts and, when the original becomes too dark for paraphrase, taking refuge in quotations. Thus this *Introduction* is a fine guide into Hegel's metaphysics and theory of knowledge.

The discussion of the celebrated section on master and slave in the *Phenomenology* is especially illuminating. It makes an important point that I had overlooked in my account, and after reading Soll's dissertation I therefore added a note to the Anchor Books paperback edition of my *Hegel* (1966, p. 137), citing him. (In the following pages I am still charged with having overlooked this point.)

The final section in this Introduction deals with "Passion in the *Logic*," with my conception of the dialectic as "the logic of passion," and with Royce's earlier use of the same phrase. As long as Soll has given so much attention to the provenance of this phrase, it would be stuffy to eschew further clarification.

The phrase "the logic of passion" came to me when I was a student, and it was with some disappointment that I encountered it in Royce a little later, in 1942. While this was nothing like Scott's finding that Amundsen had reached the south pole a month before him, it was a fly in the ointment. Royce had used the phrase in an altogether different sense and had not applied it to Hegel. Hence I did not consider it necessary to mention Royce years later when I explained in *From Shakespeare to Existentialism*, at the end of the chapter

on "The Young Hegel and Religion," in what sense "the dialectic of Hegel's *Phenomenology* is a logic of passion," and how "Hegel's own development illustrates the logic of passion." But in my *Hegel* I included some discussion of Royce's use of the phrase, leaning over backwards to be fair to him. Now Soll says that "Kaufmann fails to make clear that, when Royce uses the phrase . . . he does not use it to mean what Kaufmann does." Did I really lean over that far?

The final point in Soll's book is that I wrongly denied that the dialectic of Hegel's *Logic* is also a logic of passion. But it is only in the final paragraph of the book that Soll tries all too briefly in a few lines to persuade us of "the passion of the *Logic*." As usual, his point is worth thinking about because he calls attention to something interesting. For all that, the differences between the logic of the *Phenomenology* and that of the *Logic* remain remarkable, and the reader will have to decide for himself whether my way of putting the matter is really more misleading than Soll's.

Considering the traditional view of Hegel, it would have been a regression and some cause for disappointment if this *Introduction* denied the presence of passion in the *Phenomenology*. That the author moves in the opposite direction and insists on finding quite as much passion in the *Logic* comes as a rather delightful surprise. Most important, this is one of the very few books in English that will prove really helpful to students who are wrestling with Hegel's metaphysics.