

fore, about the value of the general plea for slowness, steadiness, and balance amid the specific awareness of the need for boldly imaginative departures from past ways of doing things with regard to such matters as land reform. The seriousness of this question is obvious at a time when the issues of world peace or war may well depend upon winning the allegiance of great masses of men for a way of life which provides for a human level of material subsistence without tyranny or military aggrandizement. For at such a time it is important not to weaken that appeal by qualifications of general principles which, in truth, are valid not in abstraction from but rather in concrete combination with the exigencies of those issues themselves. It is precisely because men live by faith as well as by bread and works that we must not allow our offer of the latter to be rendered ambiguous through insistence upon a faith which discounts their urgency and necessity.

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NIETZSCHE: PHILOSOPHER, PSYCHOLOGIST, ANTICHRIST. By Walter A. Kaufmann. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950. Pp. xi+409. \$6.00.

Of the thousand or so books on Nietzsche, this is among the most important, for it works out with considerable thoroughness an interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy sharply at variance with the usual ones. The Immoralist is found to have held a doctrine bearing a curious resemblance to opinions current in present-day America, and the irrationalist turns out to be rational after all. This reinterpretation is effected not by minimizing the importance of the will to power but rather by making it the central concept and then identifying reason with its highest manifestation: "Reason is the 'highest' manifestation of the will to power, in the distinct sense that through rationality it can realize its objective most fully" (p. 200). Whatever questions may be raised as to whether this interpretation is an accurate representation of Nietzsche's doctrine, it at least is a development of ideas which are to be found in that doctrine.

The sources of the "Nietzsche legend" which Kaufmann opposes he finds in the more or less wilful misinterpretations of Nietzsche by Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche, Stephan George, and Ernst Bertram. Nietzsche's sister is severely

censured for falsifying his biography, deleting from his works passages contradicting her own interpretations, withholding *Ecce Homo* from publication, assembling the *Will to Power* around a four-line outline (the briefest of some twenty-five left by Nietzsche) and passing it off as a magnum opus, and, in general, employing "her considerable propagandistic talents in the service of that Teutonic 'Christianity' and chauvinistic racism which Nietzsche had loathed" (p. 4). In a later chapter Kaufmann argues that the opinion that Nietzsche was a proto-Nazi can be sustained only by abandoning accepted standards of scholarship. Nietzsche's views, he says, were "quite unequivocally opposed to those of the Nazis—more so than those of almost any other prominent German of his own time or before him" (p. 267). He cites Nietzsche's consistent criticism of the state as a force intimidating men into conformity and thus preventing them from realizing themselves and his equally consistent opposition to racism.

Three aspects of Nietzsche's biography are discussed by Kaufmann as relevant to his thesis: he attributes the break with Wagner not primarily to the Christianity of *Parsifal* but to Wagner's support of the whole complex of *reichsdeutsch* ideas; he emphasizes Nietzsche's dislike of his sister's husband, in whom Kaufmann finds a true proto-Nazi; and he considers Nietzsche's insanity to be the outcome not of his philosophy but of syphilis. Kaufmann makes two preliminary points about Nietzsche's philosophy before examining it in detail: Nietzsche had a consistent, unambiguous, and coherent philosophy, but he used the aphoristic method of small single questions and experiments because any systematic presentation requires unquestioned presuppositions which constitute a restriction of reason and are therefore immoral. Second, the revaluation proposed by Nietzsche is critical rather than legislative; it does not present a new table of values but shows the old one to be, by its own standards, immoral.

In the works prior to *Zarathustra*, Kaufmann finds a continuous development in Nietzsche's thought on the problem of values. This development proceeds from the aesthetic value found in the union of the Apollonian and Dionysian through the supra-historical values of art, religion, and philosophy and through the value of self-realization to the conception of the will to power in which the earlier ideas are synthesized.

The will to power, as conceived by Kaufmann, creates values through self-overcoming,

and self-overcoming involves the sublimation of impulses. Impulses are sublimated not when they are simply weakened but when they are organized in the service of reason. Reason and impulses are both manifestations of the will to power; the will to power thus possesses an inherent capacity to differentiate itself from itself and to give itself form; it is essentially creative. Power rather than pleasure provides the moral standard because pleasure does not extend beyond consciousness whereas the will to power runs through the whole universe; further, men desire power even if it is not pleasurable. The concept of *Überwindung* leads to that of the *Übermensch*: the superman is he who has overcome himself. The concept of the superman leads to that of eternal recurrence, for in the joy of affirming his own being the superman affirms all that is: he would not have a thing different in all eternity: his formula is *amor fati*.

In accord with these interpretations, Kaufmann finds the attack on Christianity less severe than it seems. He takes pains, for example, to differentiate the pity and neighbor-love which spring from the impoverishment of life from those which spring from its overfulness. Perhaps the most startling thesis is that of the final chapter: Nietzsche's idol is unmasked as none other than Socrates! Kaufmann points out that even in the *Birth of Tragedy* Socratism is assigned an important function, that of regenerating art, and he detects in the replies to the questions of *Ecce Homo* echoes of the Socratic *Apology*.

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MAIN CURRENTS IN MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT. By John H. Hallowell. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1950. Pp. xii+759. \$4.25.

After an introductory discussion of the ancient and medieval background, this book devotes almost seven hundred pages to the leading developments in political philosophy since the seventeenth century. The distinctive feature which the author claims for the volume is that it draws attention "to the philosophical premises upon which modern political theory is based and . . . to the theological presuppositions. . . . That there is both an intimate and logically necessary connection between one's metaphysical and theological presuppositions and his political theory, I have endeavored to

illustrate in some detail in the pages which follow" (p. vii). It cannot be said, however, that the author has strictly fulfilled this large order. There is, indeed, a much greater proportion of exposition of epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, and theological doctrines than is customary in histories of political theory: Descartes, Hobbes (but not Spinoza or Leibniz), Locke, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Comte, Mill, Kierkegaard, and many others figure in this volume as propounders of more than specifically political theories. The book derives its special value from this broad and unusual compass; in addition to discussion of philosophers of the kind indicated, there is a long chapter on legal theory in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, four long chapters on socialism, three on fascism, and two on recent existentialists, philosophers of history, and theologians.

None of this, however, either demonstrates or illustrates any "logically necessary connection" between metaphysics or theology and politics. The connections which the author in fact presents are rather tenuous. In some cases there is mere juxtaposition, as in the instance of Locke, where three pages on his theory of knowledge are followed by nine on his political philosophy but with no mention of any relation between them, even such as is involved in the familiar problem of the consistency between his empiricist epistemology, with its view of moral science as being based on mind-made mixed modes, and his rationalist doctrine of natural law. A similar externality marks the relation between the seven pages devoted to Kant's epistemology and the nine pages on his ethical and political doctrines. Even in the case of Hobbes, where the "logical connection" between metaphysics and politics is far more obvious, very little is done to establish it. On the other hand, the author does exhibit the ubiquitous recourse to "dialectic" which pervades Hegel's political philosophy.

A further aspect of the author's approach consists in the ethical-religious standpoint which explicitly furnishes the criterion by which the various doctrines discussed in the book are evaluated. As Hallowell says in his Preface, "the presuppositions from which this book is written are those of the classical Christian tradition, as I understand it" (p. viii). His recourse to this standard, however, is frequently marred by an excessive facility which ignores important alternatives; for example, he can explain the acts of the Germans and Italians who embraced