

Nor are the unchanging or, if you like, eternal characteristics of universals at all incompatible with our changing interests and our changing language. Characters which once were usefully conceived are no longer so and are neglected. But if we wished, they could be used again because their relations with other characters are still what they have always been. Though the same character may be signified now by one term, now by another, and though different characters may be signified by the same term, these facts about the way in which characters are described do not alter their defining characteristics and relations.

Beyond the account of the minimal characteristics described here which universals must possess if we are to justify scientific knowledge, it is of course possible to construct elaborate metaphysical theories. Some may wish to think of universals as being more "real" than particulars; others prefer to judge them less "real." Some may wish to distinguish between the types of "reality" possessed by pure universals, by concepts, and by characteristics. But such addenda are not necessary for purposes of explaining common meanings and communicable knowledge. They are, I suspect, purely speculative undertakings. Even if their usually undefined terms, such as "real" and "reality," can be given explicit meaning, the result tends to be only a number of unverifiable though mutually incompatible metaphysical theories. From their rivalries we can safely remain detached.

The discussion of this paper justifies, I think, the following conclusion: There are unchanging characters or universals at least in the sense that the same characters can be thought of again and again, that they can be exemplified repeatedly, and that certain relations obtain among these characters whether they are exemplified or not and whether they are thought of or not.

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BOOK REVIEW

Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. WALTER A. KAUFMANN. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1950. xii + 409 pp. \$6.00.

The present book aims at a comprehensive reconstruction of Nietzsche's thought and is addressed to the general reader no less than to scholars. It is not a monograph, but seeks to capture something of the fullness and the wealth of Nietzsche's philosophy without forcing it into a Procrustean system. . . . The decision to write on Nietzsche, however, was not inspired by any agreement with him. What seems admirable is just his

deprecation of the importance of agreement and his Socratic renunciation of any effort to stifle independent thinking. Without acceding to his philosophy, one may respect his ruling passion for intellectual integrity; and his protestant perspectives are often suggestive and fruitful even when they are unacceptable. [Preface, pp. vii, x.]

Professor Kaufmann's study is an admirable addition to the ever growing volume of Nietzsche literature. It is worthy, I think, of being placed alongside Jaspers' *Einführung* and George Morgan's *What Nietzsche Means*. Dr. Kaufmann regards these, as I do, as "two most thorough and scholarly philosophic accounts of Nietzsche's thought" (pp. 189-190), though he dissents from their interpretations at many points. Just as Nietzsche held, in a familiar statement which Kaufmann quotes several times, that "one repays a teacher badly, if one always remains a pupil only," so he does not equate admiration with agreement. In a number of his disagreements with Morgan, I, in turn, am inclined to think that the latter may be nearer the truth than Kaufmann is, and since they are matters of significance it should be useful to point out some of them.

The decision to refer to Nietzsche, himself, as "Antichrist" appears in the subtitle of Kaufmann's work and the author asserts, in connection with his first reference to Nietzsche's *Antichrist*, that "Morgan's translation of the title as 'The Antichristian' . . . overlooks that Nietzsche plainly means to be as provocative as possible" (p. 7). Be that as it may, the identification of Nietzsche as "Antichrist" seems to me to overlook Nietzsche's distinction between Jesus, the Crucified One, and the Pauline Christ as well as his estimate of the value of the *Imitatio Christi* outside Christianity and apart from Christendom. Without wishing to urge a precise or artificial parallel between Nietzsche's attitude toward Jesus and toward Socrates, it seems to me that Dr. Kaufmann might well have used the same criteria and correctives which he applies so convincingly to show Nietzsche's relation to Socrates to the problem of his relation to Jesus. A distinction similar to the contrast of Socratism and Socrates is, it seems to me, relevant here, and that is what Morgan urged. To contrast, as Kaufmann does in his concluding chapters, "Nietzsche's Admiration for Socrates" with "Nietzsche's Repudiation of Christ" is surprising in a book which has argued with superb persuasiveness that even when Nietzsche "philosophizes with a hammer" he remains the subtle and sensitive dialectician.

Kaufmann seems to be arguing this case himself when, commenting on Ralph Barton Perry's suggestion "that one might better not insist on Nietzsche's affinity with Christianity, because he himself was so eager to repudiate it," he wisely urges that it "seems important, however, to distinguish between those elements which

Nietzsche attacked and those he agreed with" (p. 237). Again, and on the same page, Kaufmann counters Professor Stace's remark that "of course, self-sacrifice is a Christian, not a Nietzschean ideal" with the assertion: "We have tried to show that it is not only *a*, but nothing less than *the*, Nietzschean 'ideal.' In his keen appreciation of suffering and self-sacrifice as indispensable conditions of self-perfection, Nietzsche seems more 'Christian' than most philosophers." I can recall nothing in *What Nietzsche Means* which makes the author of the *Antichrist* less "provocative."

The issue between Morgan and Kaufmann is hardly settled by the quotation from the *Antichrist* which Kaufmann puts at the head of his chapter on "Nietzsche's Repudiation of Christ": "In truth there was only one Christian and he died on the cross," nor by the statement that "the Church is the Antichrist who has perverted Christ's original call to man to break with father and mother and become perfect" (p. 150). And, again, Kaufmann seems to be taking Morgan's side of the argument when he writes (p. 331) that while Nietzsche "charges the early Christians, including the authors of the Gospels, with the most hateful lust for revenge, he sharply distinguishes between the disciples and their master: they failed to 'understand the main point, the exemplary character of this [Jesus'] kind of death, the freedom, the superiority over any feeling of *ressentiment*'" (*Antichrist*, p. 40).

Kaufmann's criticism of Morgan's account of Nietzschean "atheism" seems to me somewhat more justifiable and on grounds similar to those already emphasized. Here, too, Nietzsche surely wished to be "as provocative as possible" and this might seem to justify Morgan in saying that "beyond question the major premise of Nietzsche's philosophy is atheism" (*What Nietzsche Means*, p. 36; quoted and criticized by Kaufmann, p. 77). But to put even a premise "beyond question is unNietzschean." Atheists can hardly be described as men who seek to question all that is questionable" (p. 77) and "Nietzsche's initial agnosticism is thus a corollary of his basic commitment to question all premises" (p. 79).

Some of Kaufmann's other criticisms of Morgan's interpretations—an unwarranted dualism of *Geist* and passion (p. 199), a redundancy in listing Nietzsche's arguments against hedonism (p. 228), an assumption that neither space nor time is continuous (p. 287), inadequate regard for the antagonism between Socratism and art (p. 345)—will be of continuing interest to Nietzsche students. According to Kaufmann, Morgan and Jaspers are both guilty of "the general practise of completely ignoring Nietzsche's exultation [exaltation?] of friendship" (p. 341). Kaufmann's fundamental

criticism of Jaspers, that the antimonies and ambiguities which he finds in Nietzsche depend "on his own *Existenzphilosophie* . . . not on the presence in Nietzsche's writings of contradictions which defy reason" (p. 54; cf. pp. 69-71) seems to me altogether well taken. Many other accusations of irrationalism brought against Nietzsche are based on comparable attempts to force him into some Procrustean bed of the critic's own devising or to a literalism which forgets that Nietzsche is a poet as well as a philosopher. Kaufmann presents Nietzsche's poetry in the best way possible—by printing a selection of his poems in the original German as well as in translation.

The troublesome question of Nietzsche's relation to the Romantic Movement inevitably crops up again and again. Not only the complexities of Nietzsche's thought but the nature of "romanticism" is involved in the problem, and Kaufmann's solution seems rather too simple. Though he recognizes the varieties of romanticism analyzed by Lovejoy, he disputes what seems to me the well argued view of Jacques Barzun that Nietzsche "was in the end 'brought back to a new romanticism'" (p. 313). Doubtless Kaufmann is right in asserting (p. 101) that "Nietzsche's early concern with art—and history—has created, or supported, the presumption that the young Nietzsche was essentially romantic." But when he goes on to say that Nietzsche "was anti-romantic even in his first three books," one can only wish that he had specified the nature of the anti-romanticism and had qualified his assertion in the same careful way in which he presents Nietzsche's relation to other predecessors, notably to Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. To Kaufmann's comment (p. 116) that Nietzsche, like earlier romanticists, "admires Lessing and Spinoza; but this superficial similarity cloaks a profound difference—and this is true of most of the parallels between Nietzsche and the German romantics," one might add that "profound differences" between recognized members of the "romantic school" could always be cited. If there is a question "whether the young Nietzsche shared George's and Schlegel's romantic dreams of a regeneration of and through the arts" it does not seem to me a question which should be answered by a simple negative nor by ascribing all difficulties to "a reflection of Wagner's neo-romantic aspirations . . . not in harmony with Nietzsche's own basic intentions" (p. 117). To identify Nietzsche's "anti-romanticism" with Goethe's, thus ascribing to the former the latter's contrast between classicism as healthy and romanticism as sick (p. 130), seems to overlook Nietzsche's own assertion (*Fröhliche Wissenschaft*) that "the word 'classical' antagonizes my ears" (p. 329).

Indeed Kaufmann's insistence that Nietzsche's "positive conception of the Dionysian was derived from Goethe's classical ideal—and not from the German romantics" seems to contradict his own excellent footnote to this very sentence in which, rejecting Joël's characterization of Nietzsche as romantic and Baroque, he adds: "The appropriateness of such categories is questionable in principle" (p. 333). I should be content to let the matter rest with some such solution or, if this be an impossibility, with Dr. Kaufmann's earlier statement that it is "possible to define the notoriously equivocal word 'romantic' in a sense which would permit its application to Nietzsche" (p. 14).

Perhaps—after repeating my general admiration for Dr. Kaufmann's work—I may offer a mild dissent to his constant use of the word "notorious" in connection with attitudes and views expressed by Nietzsche. Moreover, and even more picayune, it seems to me that a well written and carefully presented text is marred by a number of vulgarisms (e.g., pp. 35, 48, 50, 166) and a handsomely printed book by at least a half dozen misprints (pp. 67, 130, 178, 272, 279, and 341). But perhaps the proofreader should be commended since only the first of these errors is a misspelling of the name, Nietzsche.

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BOOK NOTES

La Philosophie des mathématiques: Étude sur la logistique de Russell. ANDRÉ DARBON. Foreword by René Poirier. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1949. xii + 203 pp. 400 fr.

This third posthumous volume of Professor Darbon's works (his *Études spinozistes* and *Philosophie de l'expérience* appeared in 1946) is in some ways the most rewarding. Professor Darbon retired from the University of Bordeaux in 1941 (having served as Dean of the Faculty of Letters from 1937–1941), and died in 1943, having had time to prepare only a portion of his papers for publication.

The present work is based on a course which he gave at Bordeaux before the war. Formally, it is devoted to an exposition and critique of Bertrand Russell's views on logic and the philosophy of mathematics (chiefly as set forth in the *Principles of Mathematics*, with some reference to the *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*), focussing on the relation of logic to mathematics, the concept of mathematical infinity, geometrical space, and logical realism. The first half-dozen lectures (out of a total of fourteen) are mainly