

the Nocturnal Council. But today it is perhaps better thus to overstate Plato's thesis regarding the disproportion between philosophy and politics than to follow the beaten path by failing to see a problem in the relation between philosophy and politics.

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KAUFMANN, WALTER A. *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1950. xi & 409 pp. \$6.

Mr. Kaufmann's study aims at a comprehensive reconstruction of Nietzsche's thought, with occasional references to the great tradition of Western philosophy from Plato to Hegel. This attempt is a healthy antidote to the narrow and polemical presentations of Nietzsche, though often the author's zest leads him too far in the opposite direction. He is thoroughly familiar with the whole material (published works, posthumous writings, and letters)—of which only a small part is available in English, in a poor translation—and discriminating with regard to the vast German and French literature on Nietzsche. It is regrettable that he did not include references to the criticism of modern humanity and civilization by men like Henry Adams, D. H. Lawrence, and T. E. Lawrence. Few people realize that "The Man Who Died," by D. H. Lawrence, is the only English counterpart to Nietzsche's Antichrist.

The author believes in the validity of philosophical principles and experience only in so far as they are derived from "empirical induction" without examination of its philosophical implications. Consequently he reduces Nietzsche's metaphysical experience and thought to a common level, and finds the focus of his philosophy in the psychological concepts of "sublimation," "self-perfection," and "self-overcoming." Within this limitation he avoids, however, the danger of biographical and sociological trivialization. Like G. A. Morgan's more descriptive analysis of "What Nietzsche Means," this book is a substantial guide for the student of Nietzsche's fragmentary production. Its main themes are Nietzsche's "experimental" method; the "Death of God" and the "Will to Power" as a revaluation of all values; morality and sublimation; Superman and Eternal Recurrence; Nietzsche's interpretation of Christ and Christianity; and his attitude toward Socrates.

Mr. Kaufmann is certainly right when he stresses the essential continuity of Nietzsche's thought, but one may question whether the

undeniable inconsistencies within this deeper unity can be explained away so easily. While he seems to succeed in his attempt to reconcile the Superman with the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, and both with the Will to Power, he does so at the price of reducing Nietzsche's metaphysical teachings to objectified projections of Zarathustra's self-overcoming, and the philosopher Nietzsche to an educator. But the fundamental motif of "eternity" which pervades Nietzsche's whole philosophy cannot be reduced to a "supra-historical outlook," and the key to Nietzsche's philosophy is not the human effort toward self-overcoming but the "will to be willing" the necessity of a cosmic destiny "beyond man and time." The continuity of Nietzsche's work lies on its metaphysical level; in his latest writings he fulfilled the intentions of an early essay on "Truth and Falsehood in a Transmoral Sense," and of an early sketch which posited, twenty years before Zarathustra, the alternative of deciding either for the Christian God or for the "ring of the world."

In the concluding chapter the author challenges the traditional view that Nietzsche discriminated sharply between Socratic and pre-Socratic philosophy, in favor of the latter. To support his thesis that Nietzsche tried to recapture more than anything else the ironic spirit of Socrates, Mr. Kaufmann does not hesitate to relate the desperate buffoonery of the latest Nietzsche to the ironical charm of Socrates, and to call Nietzsche's *Ecce Homo* his "Apology." He seems blind to the radical difference between the ultramodern experimentalism of Nietzsche and the ceaseless questioning of classical Socrates. "Intellectual honesty," "openmindedness," and an "unsystematic spirit" do not unqualifiedly constitute a common denominator for Socrates and Nietzsche.

There are several other instances in the book which betray a strange lack of sense of proportion. We are told (p. 64) that Nietzsche did not want to be less "scientific" than Hegel, but more so, although he had in mind the "gay science" of fearless experiment—as if Hegel's metaphysical notion of *Wissenschaft* could be compared at all with Nietzsche's dependence on positive science and rebellion against it. Another unfortunate comparison is that of Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy* with Hegel's *Phenomenology* (p. 343), on the ground that both are "dialectical" conceptions written during a war.

Since the publication of this book several significant interpretations of Nietzsche have appeared in Germany (by L. Giesz, W. Struve, M. Heidegger). These may stimulate a critical reinterpretation of Nietzsche's metaphysics in the light of the European tradition.

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