

mond could well have used the space they occupy to enlarge the scope of his highly valuable concluding survey of Browning scholarship, 1910–1949. In order “to keep . . . within due limits,” he has confined himself to studies in England and America, thus eschewing comment upon such challenging works as Paul de Reul’s *L’Art et la pensée de Robert Browning* (1929), Robert Spindler’s *Robert Browning und die Antike* (1930), and H. L. Hovelague’s *La Jeunesse de Robert Browning* (1932), and he has been compelled to give short shrift to the host of articles that have appeared in the last four decades dealing with individual poems. Upon the great body of material that he does include Professor Raymond’s judgments, based upon over a quarter century of solid labor in the vineyard, are only on relatively infrequent occasions open to informed disagreement. They are always stimulating.

The book is well-bound well-printed, and carefully edited (*Gloder* should, however, be read for *Gloder* on pages 226, 229, and 247); the index is full and accurate.

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NIETZSCHE: PHILOSOPHER, PSYCHOLOGIST, ANTICHRIST. By Walter A. Kaufmann. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950. Pp. xi+409. \$6.00.

THIS book is an effort to disengage Nietzsche from the Nietzsche Legend, and to interpret Nietzsche’s thought and intentions in the context of his total work. The Legend is traced to Nietzsche’s sister, Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche and the *George-Kreis*. The chief components of the Legend are that Nietzsche was an incoherent, ambiguous, and contradictory thinker, that he leaned toward racism, antisemitism, and State idolatry, and that he glorified brutality and physical might, conceiving the ideal man as a kind of freeating Blond Beast or Darwinian Superman. Against all this, Kaufmann argues that Nietzsche’s philosophy “is unambiguous and unequivocal, provided that one examines his philosophy as a whole” (235), that Nietzsche repudiated antisemitism and the “mendacious race swindle,” (249) and pictured the State as “the very Devil,” (100), and that his ideal was *megalopsychia* (Aristotle) (334), the largeminded spirit, who seeks power by selfcontrol and selfperfection rather than by brutally tyrannizing over competitors in a tooth-and-claw struggle for physical supremacy. In Kaufmann’s account, Nietzsche is “assigned a place in the grand tradition of Western thought and envisaged against the background of Socrates and Plato, Luther and Rousseau, Kant and Hegel. . . . The cliché of his romanticism is rejected, and his debt to Goethe and Heine emphasized. And it is suggested that he was not a Darwinist but only aroused from his dogmatic slumber by Darwin . . . and Nietzsche, too, sought to counter the positivistic challenge from across the Channel (which seemed nihilistic to him) by developing a new picture of human dignity.”

The *Prologue* outlines the origin and chief content of the Nietzsche Legend. Part I, which follows, describes the background of Nietzsche’s thought. The first chapter here contains a sketch of the philosopher’s life, and discusses Nietzsche’s relations to Wagner, the Försters, and Lou Salomé, as well as Nietzsche’s insanity. The second chapter depicts Nietzsche’s philo-

sophical method, which is called experimental (63) and "existential" (67): all truths for Nietzsche are bloody truths, *i.e.*, lived truths. Nietzsche's style, according to Kaufmann, is "monadologic": each aphorism is self-sufficient yet it throws light on almost every other aphorism (55). The third chapter, *Death of God and The Revaluation*, introduces the parallel between Nietzsche and Socrates which pervades Kaufmann's entire reconstruction. Nietzsche is described as neither an atheist nor a founder of a new religion or new set of values, but like Socrates, a merciless critic, a vivisectionist of all current values, bent on defending honesty, courage, and intellectual integrity against the shams of his epoch.

Part II is entitled *The Development of Nietzsche's Thought*. The opening chapter is on Art and History. In his search for a sanction for modern values—God being dead—Nietzsche first turned to the Greeks and Art. In beauty he believed he found a triumph over need, want, sickness, and disease—the triumph of health. The aesthetic realization (cf. *Symposium*) remained a permanent element of Nietzsche's value philosophy. However, Nietzsche's studies of History which led him to repudiate the idea of straightline Progress revealed other heroes besides artists scattered accidentally through time: a variety of the "highest specimens" (124) especially saints and philosophers. To elucidate further Nietzsche's budding ideal, Kaufmann cites Nietzsche's contrast of Rousseau with Goethe: the return to nature versus the ideal of transfiguring nature. The final chapter of Part II locates the apex of Nietzsche's intellectual development in the discovery of the Will to Power. Nietzsche's masterwork, the book he himself liked best, *Also Sprach Zarathustra*, embodies this climax. The earlier dualism, Apollinian versus Dionysian, reason versus desire, is now merged in a monism of power, whose supreme "specimen" Nietzsche tends to find in the philosopher who has attained complete mastery of his natural powers.

Part III is a lengthy exposition of Nietzsche's philosophy of power. As a moral doctrine, the central concept of this philosophy is described as the principle of "Self-Overcoming" (183). This means the sublimation of natural impulse: not its emasculation or extirpation (Christianity)—Borgia and the Blond Beast are preferable to that—but its transfiguration (198). The intellect as well as the passions is an expression of the will to power. The struggle is not for life (Darwin), but for more life, which the rational ordering of life, taught by Spinoza as well as Socrates, makes possible. In this connection, according to Kaufmann, Nietzsche repudiates the Pleasure Principle as the moral standard. Suffering is a necessary means to self-fulfillment. Yet suffering is not the end for Nietzsche. "Rather he insisted that man, by nature, strives for something to which pleasure and pain are only incidental." (236-37). The good life is the creative life, a creative overcoming involving "a measure of discomfort and pain," (239), and Nietzsche's moral philosophy here is an "apotheosis of creativity" (242). The concept of the Master Race is to be understood in this perspective. This Race is not a biological species, but a spiritual type, "a future, internationally mixed, race of philosophers and artists who cultivate iron self-control." (266). Nietzsche's philosophy of power, says Kaufmann, "culminates in the dual vision of the superman and the eternal recurrence." (270). *Der Übermensch* is neither a Darwinian super organism, nor a being

good, as Carlyle would have it, on account of his political strength, his ability to subjugate social anarchy. He is simply the passionate human being who is master of his passions (246). The doctrine of Eternal Recurrence fits in with this conception. It is the denial of indefinite progress (281). Progress is not a matter of time, but of achievement. The Eternal Recurrence has a moral meaning, referring to the recapitulation of all values in a supreme human life on earth. But its meaning is also cosmological (287). These meanings fuse in the man "who has organized the chaos of his passions and integrated every feature of his character, redeeming even the ugly by giving it a meaning in a beautiful totality—this Übermensch would also realize how inextricably his own being was involved in the totality of the cosmos: and in affirming his own being, he would also affirm all that is, has been, or will be" (281).

Part IV, entitled *Synopsis*, has two chapters, *Nietzsche's Repudiation of Christ*, and *Nietzsche's Admiration for Socrates*. Regarding Christ, what Nietzsche repudiates, according to Kaufmann, is not merely the hypocrisy of those who profess Christianity but act in an antichristian manner (bourgeois morality), nor merely the antirationalism of Luther, nor the extirpation of the passions of the ascetic. Nietzsche also repudiates the doctrine of meek submission. "This was not Nietzsche's ideal of the passionate man who controls his passions . . . but a childlike state of freedom from the passions. In the *Antichrist* Nietzsche thus speaks of a 'case of delayed . . . puberty'" (299). Nietzsche also scorns the romanticism of those who seek to overcome the emptiness of self by intoxication, convulsion, anaesthesia, and frenzy, crying out for a Saviour (Wagner) (328), while the war he glorifies is not physical battle but the struggle to overcome the self by internal resources, notably by irony, discipline, and reason. This last is what Nietzsche finds so beautifully embodied in the Socrates of *Apology*, that physician of the soul and gadfly, who exhibits in his hardy being such a masterful integration of the theoretical and practical components of human nature (347-49).

Kaufmann concludes his book with an *Epilogue* describing briefly Nietzsche's influence on subsequent thought, and an appendix, *Nietzsche as a Poet*, which includes a number of Nietzsche's poems in German and English translation, printed opposite each other.

In general, Kaufmann is no advocate of Nietzsche's philosophy even as reconstructed. His admiration is evident. But he cites doctrines that seem to him questionable, such as the Eternal Recurrence as a cosmological principle, and in several places he notes the incongruity between Nietzsche's prevailing state or manner and the ideals that the philologist-philosopher espouses. "The frenzied vehemence of many passages seems far from the majestic calm and the mature repose of Nietzsche's 'most spiritual man'—of Socrates or Goethe" (337). However, Kaufmann's chief aim is not to criticize or defend the views of Nietzsche, but to state them in the light of the philosopher's total literary output. In this he does an able, detailed, and workmanlike job. The impression is not altogether dispelled, however, that this new version of Nietzsche's thought is a generous selection from a teeming argument that has 'romantic' and 'decadent' implications as well as the sane and healthful implications emphasized by the author. Thus, the rather limited self-glorifying character of the Nietzschean hero—a reflection of what the bachelor sage

in moments of romantic self-exaltation would like to be—and Nietzsche's comparative neglect of constructive social suggestions characteristic of 'decadent' egoism, do not occupy the strong position in the total picture that they probably deserve. Nevertheless, no student of Nietzsche can afford to overlook this wellreasoned and welldocumented book.

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DEUTSCHE LITERATURGESCHICHTE VON DEN ANFÄNGEN BIS ZUR GEGENWART.  
Von Fritz Martini. Dritte Auflage. Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Verlag,  
1951. (Kröners Taschenausgabe, Band 196) Pp. xii+605. Bound, DM.  
9.50.

AFTER the biased interpretations of the Nazi Era it is a pleasure to review once more a history of German literature written from an avowedly idealistic, comprehensive, and international point of view. No longer does one find the ill-founded racial and nationalistic evaluations and allusions; nor is there any other materialistic interpretation in medical or psychiatric or economic terms. Literature is once more taken as the expression of ideas in a language, and the ideas are imbedded in the whole European fabric of culture. The multiplicity of Fritz Martini's approach not only fully agrees with the rich scholastic harvest of the last decades, but also prevents any one-sided attention to particular trends and personalities and any narrow conceptualism in the delineation of the periods. In addition the book is written in a lucid and uninvolved style.

The fruitfulness of Martini's method becomes at once apparent in the first chapters of the book. German culture is correctly described as an inseparable blend of primitive Germanic, of classical, and of Christian traditions; there is no false glorification of the Germanic as such. Cluniac literature receives a carefully balanced appreciation, and its writers are not berated for a fanatical asceticism which they did not have. The romantic concept of "Spielmannsepen" is properly questioned.

The chapters on Middle High German Literature are rich in outlook and penetrating in criticism. Neither the impact of the East through the crusades, nor the influence of Arabic culture in Spain, neither the traditions of primitive German folksong nor of Marian mysticism, nor of Latin student lyrics are neglected in the approach to courtly culture. Wolfram von Eschenbach and Walther von der Vogelweide are discussed as representatives of Christian humanism and not of any superimposed nationalistic or political trend. The treatment of love by Gottfried von Strassburg is likewise seen in medieval, and not in modern perspective. Among the Minnesingers Heinrich von Morungen is properly recognized as one of the greatest German lyric poets. The lack of true Christianity in the *Nibelungenlied* is emphasized and prevents a romantic over-estimate of the venerable epic.

The end of the Middle Ages, the periods of Humanism and Reformation, the Seventeenth Century have found a more than adequate analysis. One only wonders why there is no sharper division between the first five books of Grimmelshausen's *Simplicissimus* and the sixth book, which was added later. And is it really possible to justify the description of Christian Reuter as an