

fundity never have been sufficiently recognized during the two decades and more since he came to this country. Heimann's fellow social scientists have neglected his work because he has consistently refused to isolate sociology, economics, and political science from one another (this is "unscientific") and because he has insisted that a theological framework is more adequate than any other for interpreting the data of the social sciences (this is "heresy"). One would think that ministers and theologians would have welcomed the wealth of insight of *Freedom and Order* (1947), yet the book never sold well. Ten years have passed; it might well be that an audience is ready now—provided that the present volume is issued in the language in which its author originally wrote it.

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Modern Science and Human Values. By EVERETT W. HALL. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956. 483 pages. \$8.00.

According to the subtitle, this is a study in the history of ideas. The first part of the book traces the changes in the ways in which men approached the fields of the physical sciences and economics. The second part consists in a similar approach to the field of values in the area of ethics, aesthetics, and jurisprudence. Beginning with the Aristotelianism of the medieval world, the author traces developments to the recent past. The Aristotelian approach was a "common-sense" attitude, in which the distinction between value and fact was disregarded or at least left indistinct. This was replaced during the Renaissance by experimentalism, in which the establishment of fact was central. But this did not satisfy the feelings of many, and the Romantic reaction occurred. Contemporary thinkers, according to Hall, have once again reaffirmed the sharp distinction between "value" and "fact." This represents a commendable achievement from Hall's point of view.

These changes are integrated with the socio-cultural conditions of the several periods, and it is well done. It should make the history of ideas as here presented more interesting and stimulating to his readers. In the second part of the book, the author turns his attention to the changes which have occurred in men's attitudes toward values. From the theological approach of the medieval world, Hall traces the developments whereby the theological framework was

discarded and a scientific framework developed. This in turn has been replaced by a sharp distinction between the realms of value and fact. According to Hall, value considerations and fact considerations constitute independent but associated realms. As such, they must not be confused.

But this poses a problem. If the method of observation basic to science cannot be used in the establishment of value, how are values to be established? Are we left with skepticism or dogmatism in this realm? The author admits that there are no answers to this question available at present. He does suggest two proposals whereby we may escape from the present unsatisfactory situation. The first is that "the value of anything is determined by the nature of that thing" (p. 472). This means that, whereas there is no universal and necessary connection between fact and value, there still are some "associations" between them. This was argued at some length in his *What Is Value?* (1952). The second is that we must rely upon "attitudes and emotion" rather than upon perception as the cognitive instruments for the investigation of values (p. 473). Neither of these suggestions is developed in this volume, but they are presented as possibly fruitful approaches.

Hall has apparently accepted two of Kant's basic conceptions. The first is Kant's sharp distinction between the rational and the valuational approaches to the investigation of reality, and the second is Kant's reliance upon feelings (*das Gefühl*) as his cognitive instrument in the moral realm. Kant's conception of feeling as a cognitive instrument is discussed at some length in Harald Eklund's *Die Würde der Menschheit* (1947). I suggest that Hall's primary problem is categorical, namely, the determination of the basic subject matter of given fields. His present conclusions parallel those of Nicolai Hartmann, *Ethics* (1932), and to this reader are equally unconvincing.

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Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre. Selected and introduced by WALTER KAUFMANN. New York: Meridian Books, 1956. 319 pages. \$1.45.

Readers will find *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre* helpful as an introduction to

existentialist thought. Kaufmann has selected excerpts and entire writings from prominent representatives of existentialism—Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Rilke, Kafka, Jaspers, Heidegger, Camus, and Sartre—and has compiled an anthology which can be recommended particularly for the lay reader. Certain writings from Jaspers, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Heidegger are made available for the first time in translation. The selections from Jaspers' philosophical works are particularly well chosen, giving the reader a rudimentary acquaintance with the breadth of Jaspers' thought. It is unfortunate, however, that selections from Kierkegaard's *Concept of Dread* and *The Sickness unto Death* were not included in the anthology, as they comprise his most penetrating and incisive works. Also the omission of Gabriel Marcel is hardly justified in an anthology of existentialist literature.

Kaufmann's Introduction, which constitutes only one-sixth of the book, is illuminating at points but not wholly adequate. The author seems to be more concerned to accentuate the differences among the existentialists, some of which appear to be petty and insignificant, than to provide the reader with a statement of the nature and scope of existentialism as a literary and philosophical program. Jaspers, Heidegger, and Sartre are affirmed to be in fundamental disagreement on essentials, and, by the time Pascal and Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky and Nietzsche, and Kafka and Camus are added to the company, Kaufmann concludes that "it becomes plain that one essential feature shared by all these men is their perfervid individualism" (p. 11). Kaufmann is convinced that no existentialist has a good word for another existentialist, and in his opinion philosophical issues are often reduced to a clash of personalities. The author does, however, attempt a definition of existentialism. "The refusal to belong to any school of thought, the repudiation of the adequacy of any body of beliefs whatever, and a marked dissatisfaction with traditional philosophy as superficial, academic, and remote from life—that is the heart of existentialism" (p. 12). One may well agree with Kaufmann that the existentialists have some rather far-reaching reservations about "schools of thought" and certain varieties of traditional philosophy, but to say that this is the "heart of existentialism" is another matter. To define existentialism in these purely negative terms will hardly suffice. Existentialism, particularly

as a philosophical program, must properly be understood in positive terms as an attempt to provide an answer to the question, "What does it mean to exist?" through an analysis and description of man's concrete, historical, lived experience. And on this basic and primary intention all existentialists are in agreement. Furthermore, a careful reading of the existentialists will disclose that in their analysis and description of the human situation certain common "structures" of existence are suggested or, as in Heidegger, systematically delineated—concern or care, possibility, anxiety, despair, death, time, history, conscience, guilt, and decision. Although these "structures" may have a different significance for the various existentialist thinkers, they can properly be understood as the basic and distinctive categories of existential philosophy.

Kaufmann's discussion of Kierkegaard comprises one of the least adequate sections of the Introduction. Kierkegaard is described as a "frequently befuddled thinker"; "in revolt against the wisdom of the Greeks"; "anti-philosophical" in general, and specifically "anti-Plato," "anti-Hegel," "anti-Thomas," and "anti-Copernicus" (p. 16). In short, according to Kaufmann, Kierkegaard abandons reason and thought altogether and anathematizes philosophy. To be sure, in Kierkegaard's writings one can find isolated passages which seem to suggest a thoroughgoing anti-intellectualism and disparagement of philosophy (Kaufmann quotes one such passage from the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*: "The conclusions of passion are the only reliable ones" [p. 18]). But this is to neglect the tension between passion and reason, imagination and thought, voluntarism and intellectualism, which permeates the whole of Kierkegaard's works. Kierkegaard, in reaction to the "pure thought" of Hegelian rationalism, places a high premium on pretheoretical awareness and the revealing function of mood and feeling, but he also affirms the validity and relevance of thought. In the *Postscript* he writes: "If thought speaks deprecatingly of the imagination, imagination in its turn speaks deprecatingly of thought; and likewise with feeling. The task is not to exalt the one at the expense of the other, but to give them an equal status, to unify them in simultaneity; the medium in which they are unified is *existence*" (p. 311). One must not overlook the fact that for Kierkegaard "the subjective thinker is an existing individual and a thinker

at one and the same time" (*ibid.*, p. 314). The subjective thinker strives to penetrate his concrete particularity with thought (*ibid.*, p. 267). Kierkegaard did not proclaim an end to philosophic thought but insisted that the passional and the rational, the ethical and the intellectual, are inseparably bound up at their very source—existence.

The author's introductory exposition of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Jaspers, and Sartre is more commendable. He seems to be "closer to home" when he deals with these existentialists. Yet the reader cannot avoid the impression that, in his discussion of Heidegger and Jaspers, Kaufmann is more concerned to criticize their interpretations of Nietzsche than to delineate their understanding of the nature of the philosophical enterprise. The author's persistent eagerness to find faulty historical interpretations, contradictions, and obscurities in the thought of Heidegger and Jaspers takes precedence over the desire to explicate the fundamental issues with which they deal.

Despite these shortcomings, the Introduction contains some penetrating insights, and the selections, in the main, are well chosen, giving the reader a fair representation of the field. *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre* is a book which not only offers enjoyable reading but contributes to an understanding of a philosophical and literary movement which is achieving greater and greater significance in our day.

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The New Man: Christianity and Man's Coming of Age. By RONALD GREGOR SMITH. New York: Harper & Bros., 1956. 120 pages. \$2.50.

This book consists of a series of five lectures originally given at the invitation of the Senatus of the Theological Hall, Ormond College, Melbourne, Australia, and in condensed form at Knox College, Dunedin, Scotland. It would appear also that the lectures were published as essentially given. There are few footnotes, but the text includes an extensive exposition of issues in the history of Western thought. The material is seminal and suggestive rather than fully explicated.

The theme of this book is that Christianity must be rethought in relation to the situation of the men today. The man of today has come

of age, and conceptions of the past cannot be rechristianized. From a historical perspective, Dr. Smith believes that the Renaissance moved toward a new creative conception of man but did not complete its task; that the Reformation soon worked in old traditional molds; and that we are only today finding our way into the light of day. The old metaphysical conceptions must be abandoned, and the picture of the world forged within Christian history in relation to certain philosophical and scientific conceptions must finally be abandoned.

In the light of this historical judgment, the author contends that the most creative thinker of our time is Bultmann. Although the exposition is brief, Smith has given the most vigorous defense of Bultmann that the present writer has seen. He does not believe that Bultmann has "replaced one philosophy by another"—as is usually contended—but that his existentialist analysis is descriptive or phenomenologic, a kind of propaedeutic which sweeps away all the pretensions. In addition to Bultmann, Smith believes that the significant figures in our time for this problem are Bonhoeffer, Niebuhr, Tillich, and Buber. Needless to say, the author does not suggest that they are all saying the same thing.

Smith calls for a conception of this-worldly transcendence. "God is met in His works and gifts, not in Himself, and not in an idea of Him. He is met at the luminous point of human existence, where the individual faces Him in utter openness, receives forgiveness and is made free. This facing of God is always in and through, and not other than or additional to the facing of other people in the emergent community of them. The eternal is in time, heaven is through earth, the supernatural not other than the natural, the spiritual not more than the holy human" (pp. 111-12). Obviously, such a conception is suggestive but needs elaboration. Perhaps the latter can be expected of Smith, who, after several years as editor and manager of the Student Christian Movement Press, now holds a chair of divinity at Classical University.

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Ceci est mon corps. By F.-J. LEENHARDT. ("Cahiers théologiques," No. 37.) Paris and Neuchâtel: Delachaux & Niestle S.S., 1955. 73 pages. Swiss fr. 385.