

it must be organized. As power is organized it becomes an autonomous entity, a super-individual thing which one must . . . tend and serve. And he who has sought and striven for it is first in line of service. The ruler is transformed into the servant of his own power. The objectives of power begin to restrict personal caprice, and the hour of *raison d'état* has struck."

These are suggestive ideas; but they are not theory. They do not offer any systematic method for assessing the conditions of achieving the values that Meinecke recognizes. Meinecke's political reflections exhibit rampant confusion between explaining and valuing: "The objects of historical observation, the individual states, can be understood only if they are granted the unconditional right to act solely in accordance with their own nature and profit." He illustrates, and even champions, another familiar misconception, the idea that appreciating the individuality of historical and political phenomena is incompatible with elaborating general laws about them. He condemns absolutist "either/or" thinking on moral questions for the rigidity and hypocrisy that it leads to; but, as his preoccupation with polarities shows, he never sufficiently liberated himself from either/or thinking to obtain the advantages of a theoretical description of political reality. He failed to see that there are manifold institutional solutions for the problems raised by his polarities. Instead, he was led by his determination to be realistic and unsentimental, to share the unimaginative conception of political possibilities that typifies "practical" statesmen.

How many of the moral tragedies which Meinecke supposes entrap statesmen are genuine ones? May statesmen ever be excused for choosing national security at the cost of abandoning, even temporarily, all efforts to create a world community? They should not be let off so easily. Surely it is always both correct and practical to prescribe that they should steadily work for world community without failing to take temporary precautions for national security; this is in effect quite different from allowing that they may sometimes choose national security exclusively, or devote only gestures and odd hours to advancing peace. The choice is never either/or; it is always a matter of adjusting short-run and long-run considerations while budgeting for a number of goals simultaneously.

If statesmen are sometimes forced to act outside conventional morality, that is not because

what they do is or must be or ought to be a matter of moral indifference, but because international moral conventions have not yet obtained the institutional guarantees that exist within nations. Extension of such institutions to the world as a whole will not come about (as Meinecke saw) merely by wishing for them; it will come about only by a great effort of invention and experiment (which Meinecke discounted in advance). Before Meinecke turned into a reluctant supporter of the League of Nations, and even afterward, he did not sufficiently recognize that the "realistic" view of national interests—*raison d'état*—was inhibiting the development of practical international institutions. It still is.

DAVID BRAYBROOKE

Yale University

CRITIQUE OF RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY. By Walter Kaufmann. New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. Pp. xvii+325. \$5.00.

Professor Kaufmann's *Critique* is a witty, learned, sometimes exasperating book. Almost no one will be entirely pleased with it, since hardly a school or party in current philosophy and theology escapes reproof. Existentialism, analytical philosophy, neo-Thomism, crisis theology, Unitarianism, Freud, Fromm, Bultmann, Carnap, and Ryle, to give only a partial list, are viewed, examined (or at least mentioned), and found wanting. In view of Kaufmann's numerous and varied targets, readers are sure to disagree as to which one he strikes most successfully.

The opening three parts, which largely concern philosophy, seem on the whole less carefully developed than the more searching and skilful critique of theology that follows. Kaufmann attacks Existentialism for its *Schwärmerei*, while granting that it possesses at least one of the characteristics of all great philosophy, "an invitation to a different way of life." In contrast to Existentialism, Kaufmann finds another "timeless tendency" in what he calls positivism. He rebukes positivists for being insensitive to profound experience, and he notes "messianic overtones" in both positivism and Existentialism. Of the two "types of positivism" on the current scene, the type whose exponents use symbolic logic is quickly dismissed. Kaufmann accuses this group of being unconcerned with traditional philosophy and the problem of

religious truth (p. 16). I think he is mistaken in this; but since he does not offer any reasons to support his view, it will be more profitable to turn to his somewhat fuller discussion of the second type of positivism. This he calls "analytic philosophy" and some of his criticisms of it are that it "ignores experience, especially aesthetic and religious experience" (p. 25); that it "seeks a haven," its analyses being "strangely remote from actual experience"; and that in its efforts to be faithful to ordinary language it is "well on its way toward succeeding Idealism as the prime apologist for Christianity and bourgeois morals" (p. 2). The fact that some analytical philosophers are intense about questions of justice, love music, and may be emotional does not obscure the point that "large areas of experience are ignored" (p. 33). These unsympathetic judgments seem to me regrettable, as do some of Kaufmann's highly emotional statements on religion, not so much because they are unfounded (for all of them may be at least partly just) as because they are sure to distract many readers from those parts of the *Critique* which deserve round applause.

Part IV, "Religion, Faith, and Evidence," is such a part. It begins with a rejection of various definitions of religion. Some are too intellectualistic, conceiving religion merely as a set of propositions claimed to be true; others are equally one-sided in emphasizing the emotional or practical character of religious commitments, to the exclusion of intellectual aspects. Kaufmann's examination of the notion of "subjective truth" is superb. Kierkegaard is attacked, and numerous confusions exposed. William James's "The Will To Believe," which Kaufmann calls "an unwitting compendium of common fallacies and a manual of self-deception," is given a splendid treatment. Part V, "The God of the Philosophers," discusses the traditional proofs and refutations. Like some other parts of the book it has somewhat the flavor of an introductory text book, albeit a very good one. It is made lively by an *ad hominem* attack on Aquinas for supporting the conscience of his times instead of defying it, as Amos and Isaiah defied the religious convictions of their day. Gilson, Copleston, and Pegis are criticized for concealing or ignoring the Saint's views on the proper treatment of heretics. The section ends with an incisive discussion of Pascal's wager.

Whether Kaufmann does justice to Bultmann and Tillich I cannot say. Some of his remarks seem intentionally provocative:

There is no nonsense whatever which may not be said to be symbolically true, especially if its symbolic meaning is not stated [p. 136, his italics]. . . . The sacrifice of a few hours' crucifixion followed by everlasting bliss at the right hand of God in heaven, while millions are suffering eternal tortures in hell, is hardly the best possible symbol of love and self-sacrifice. The boss's son who works briefly at lower jobs before he joins his father at the head of the company [p. 145].

But the attack on theology is extremely interesting, and the dialogue entitled "Satanic Interlude or How To Go to Hell" is very clever. In it, Satan confronts a theologian, a Christian, and an atheist. No doubt every theologian, Christian, and atheist will feel that *his* position has been caricatured, the others portrayed accurately.

Kaufmann's treatment of Judaism and Buddhism is more sympathetic than his treatment of Christianity. I think this is not mere partiality but stems from his critical opposition to theology, coupled with his belief that Judaism and Buddhism do not depend on theology so that with these religions the problem of dogmatism is not as acute as it is for Christianity. He does mention that "the Socratic conscience" remained undeveloped in Judaism, and he points out not only the similarities between Socrates and Rabbi Akiba but also their differences.

Liberal Protestantism is upbraided for reading its own moral values into certain scriptural texts while blandly ignoring others. "The Jesus of most liberal Protestants and Unitarians is not the historical Jesus but a moral fiction, a poetic conception" (p. 258). The Higher Bible Criticism is rebuked for errors of scholarship and bias. Reinhold Niebuhr is criticized for ignoring the extent to which Jesus' ethic was prudential and heteronomous, and for rewriting history "in accordance with the requirements of his own inwardness." The modern Protestant theologians' defiance of true scholarship evinces "an enmity to reason and its rules which has been prominent in Christianity from the beginning" (p. 216). Impressive quotations from Luther (p. 218) support the charge that irrationalism is no recent innovation. Catholicism is no better, Kaufmann insists; "the vaunted synthesis of reason and faith depended on the stake" (p. 221).

It is much easier to distill Kaufmann's criticisms than to summarize his positive theses. As a sort of grand finale to the book, there is a paean to reason, but it is preceded by a sec-

tion which admonishes us to read religious scriptures "with an open heart," and a discussion of "man's profoundest privation" which Kaufmann calls an "ontological privation" experienced by "man . . . whether he is aware of it or not." It is a need "to love and create" (p. 302). The divine, we are told, is "not an object, it is a challenge" (p. 305). Some readers may find this edifying. Curiously, the term "love" is used without any clarification, though Kaufmann devotes an earlier chapter (chap. 29) to exposing the extreme ambiguity and vagueness of this term. But since he argues that inconsistency in literature need not be a fault perhaps he feels that in philosophy too it may have its place. At any rate, apparently the book is not intended to be read with a scholarly magnifying glass. If one reads it "with an open heart," there are sure to be rewards.

ARNULF ZWEIG

University of Oregon

AUTHORITY. Edited by Carl J. Friedrich. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958. Pp. vi+234. \$5.00.

Spokesmen from diverse areas in the social sciences, philosophy, and law undertake in this volume to explain the nature and meanings of authority. Ten of the thirteen essays are papers read at the 1956 meeting of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy or elaborations of comments there made; three, equally germane, are independent.

"It is our belief," writes Professor Carl Friedrich for the Society, "that these problems [of political and legal philosophy] require interdisciplinary exploration, treatment, and discussion." Few would quarrel with this statement of principle. But many readers of this volume will finish it, I fear, with the thought that whatever may be said of the exploration, the interdisciplinary treatment and discussion have scarcely begun.

The conceptions of authority offered here are almost (if not quite) as numerous as the essays. For Bertrand de Jouvenal "the birth of any association displays the building power of pure authority. . . ." "Such a relation exists by our definition whenever B does A's bidding without A's enjoyment of any endowment whereby he may bribe or threaten B or any superadded prestige." For David Easton power may or may not be naked; the important thing is B's obedi-

ence: "If A sends a message to B and B adopts this message . . . without evaluating it . . . A has exercised *authority* over B." B's motivation in this case might raise a question as to the authority's legitimacy; in the former case no such question can arise.

For Hannah Arendt authority presupposes "the experience of founding." But since the twentieth century has lost those things which alone can keep this experience alive, namely religion and tradition, it follows that in the modern world there is no such thing as authority. "The very term has become clouded by controversy and confusion." Hence "the loss of tradition and religion have become political events of the first order." There is little left for us embroiled in a "constant, ever-widening, ever-deepening crisis," save to confront anew "the elementary problems of human living-together."

Professor Frank Knight agrees that the situation is serious. He has little patience, however, with "proposals for turning the clock of history back and re-establishing the absolutes." He speaks hopefully of "progress through free inquiry, with truth so defined as the one final authority," but wisely qualifies his optimism with a warning: "application of 'scientific method' in this grand division of knowledge" is still a subject of controversy.

For Friedrich authority is neither a kind of power nor, except indirectly, a quality of persons but "a *quality* of communication" such that it is susceptible to reasoned elaboration or rational defense. But this "reasoning," he argues,

is not necessarily, nor even usually, employed in fact, though it may be hinted at, or suggested by symbols. But it is important that the "potentiality of reasoned elaboration" of the communication exists. In other words, not the psychological concomitant of a belief in the capacity of the authority for such reasoned elaboration is decisive, but the actual existence of such a capacity. . . . The respect, esteem, or other psychological concomitants, while undoubtedly present, are not a distinctive feature of authority. Power, wealth, and a host of other qualities likewise occasion these reactions.

A possible complement to Friedrich's view is that presented by E. Adamson Hoebel under the title "Authority in Primitive Societies." "Underlying every culture," Hoebel writes, is a body of basic postulates implicit in the world view of the members. . . . These are broadly gen-