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he was concerned to elucidate, to render clear and distinct, our complex ideas. With this aim Biran agreed. But Biran held that Locke had failed to distinguish adequately between those abstract ideas which arise from internal, and those which arise from external, experience. It is only internal experience, Biran held, which can be the original of our complex ideas of self, of freedom and liberty, of causality, and so forth.

It was with Hume, however, that Biran was most concerned to come to grips. Hume had asked, "From what impression is our idea of self derived?" He could find no answer. But this, Biran contended, was only because Hume had put the question wrongly. Hume should have asked, "From what part of experience is the idea of self derived?" Had he asked this question, he would have found that we derive the idea of self from the experience of our will, from the sense of our effort to move our own bodies. In like manner, Hume had held that "all events seem entirely loose and separate . . . they seem *conjoined*, but never *connected*." Thereby Hume established that the idea of causation can be discovered only within ourselves. Biran has not failed to pay tribute to Hume for this insight. But when Hume went on to ground the notion of causation in the habit of expectation, Biran rebelled. "A being which had never exerted effort," he held, "would really have no idea of force, nor, by consequence, any idea of efficient cause." But of course each of us does exert effort, and—as Biran never tired of pointing out—in thus sensing our own effort, we grasp immediately the relation between cause and effect.

Hallie has also considered Biran's defense against Hume of human liberty, and he has compared the doctrine of Biran with that of Berkeley. The book ends with a judicious weighing of Biran's contributions and an analysis of his limitations.

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FROM SHAKESPEARE TO EXISTENTIALISM. Studies in Poetry, Religion, and Philosophy. By WALTER KAUFMANN. Boston, Beacon Press, 1959. Pp. x, 404. \$5.95.

This book is a collection of twenty "studies," earlier versions of most of which have appeared in various books and periodicals over the past ten years. It is viewed by its author as a companion piece to his *Critique of Religion and Philosophy*, and those who are already

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familiar with the aggressive humanism, the religious myopia, and the tedious sententiousness and self-citation of that book will find some more of the same here.

Although Professor Kaufmann says that his book "traces a historical development" (p. ix), and although he speaks of "the development from Shakespeare to existentialism" (p. 190), one is, after having read the book, at a loss to say what the development is supposed to be a development of. Sometimes it seems that the development in question is the development of "the relationships between religion and poetry and philosophy" (p. 345) from Shakespeare to the existentialists. But if this is its theme, then the book does not begin to cover its subject; for the only non-German poet treated at any length is Shakespeare, and English and French philosophers are only occasionally mentioned. Writing about "German Thought After World War II" (ch. 18) Kaufmann says, "The Germans tend to think of philosophy as something peculiarly their own. Indeed, as they see it, there are only two kinds of philosophy: Greek and German" (p. 338). (Cf. also pp. 257-258.) But if this book is any indication Kaufmann, despite his critical tone of voice, really believes that the Germans are right—and not only about philosophy. These essays are dominated by the figures of Nietzsche, Goethe, and Hegel (in that order); Socrates and Shakespeare figure, too, but only as earlier incarnations of Nietzsche.

At other times, however, the book seems to be about the development of something else, namely, the kind of humanism that has the courage not only to live in, but to celebrate, a world in which God is dead. But again if this were really the case one would expect some serious treatment of Spinoza, Hume, Voltaire, Gibbon, J. S. Mill, George Eliot, to mention only a few of those who have played just as important a role in *this* development as Goethe and Nietzsche.

Despite Kaufmann's claims to the contrary, this book is not really about the development of anything. It is a loose collection of "studies" which he has tried unsuccessfully to weave into a coherent whole. But taken individually, some of these essays should be of interest to serious students of philosophy: there are two fine essays on Hegel (chs. 7 and 8), one on Kierkegaard (ch. 10), one on Heidegger (ch. 17), and an interesting piece on German philosophy after World War II (ch. 18). Professor Kaufmann is at his best as an expositor and critic of German philosophy. In this role he has no peer in America. It is regrettable, therefore, that he has wasted his talents and energies

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in this book upon subjects on which he is neither very interesting nor very enlightening instead of devoting them to, say, a full-dress book on Hegel.

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AN ENQUIRY INTO GOODNESS. By F. E. SPARSHOTT. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1958. Pp. xiv, 304. \$5.50.

The main business of this book is to present, defend, and apply the formula "To say that x is good is to say that it is such as to satisfy the wants of the person or persons concerned" (p. 122). This is intended to provide a schema for elucidating all uses of "good" save those secondary uses where the word has degenerated into a mere emotional response or into a shorthand for the customary criteria by which goodness is estimated. Thus, what is *said* when "good" is used is something very general and indefinite, but more specific statements are presupposed about just which wants of which people. This lack of specificity enables Sparshott to claim that he is not a naturalist in Moore's sense, because his view makes "That which is such as to satisfy the wants of the person[s] concerned is good" nonsensical rather than analytic. From another point of view, however, he could be called a naturalist since he denies that "good" has any sort of special normative force; we are just naturally interested in what is good because we are just naturally interested in what will satisfy wants.

The analysis is applied to ethics proper by means of the notion of a good man. "By our formula, a good man is one who has a fixed disposition to fulfill the wants of the persons concerned, and he can have this disposition only if he acts on the principle of fulfilling them" (p. 184). This may look like simple Utilitarianism but in Sparshott's hands it is not. In order to apply the principle the agent must decide just which people are concerned in his action, and here the notions of obligation, moral rule, duty, and so forth, will come to the fore. Sparshott refuses to "reduce" these concepts to terms of goodness—he accepts, for example, Hare's view that "ought" statements are very like universal imperatives—but he does try to relate the two sorts of concept to each other, relying mainly on the concept of rightness, which he regards, at least at one point, as somehow intermediate. But I was unable to follow the argument here.