

Religion and Art. PAUL WEISS. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1963. Pp. 97.

Although this essay was first delivered as The Aquinas Lecture to the Phi Sigma Tau Society at Marquette University, it represents a systematic outline of the relation between religion and art in existence, and as such, is typical of the writings of Paul Weiss. Religion and art are both viewed by the author as having each an independent and distinctive contribution to make to human experience, and also as being related to other enterprises of man's cultural experience. This approach eliminates the claim of uniqueness in each discipline, and yet preserves the significance of each phenomenon. Since each topic is related to other facets of experience, neither can be regarded as being unique in the sense of being incomparable. Consequently, sacramental works of art are seen as art in the service of religion, and secularized religion is viewed as a subdivision of art. Both phenomena supplement and complete each other when viewed under the category of relation. These relations are developed systematically by the author and left in outline form. But they do reflect the primary intent of each discipline, to wit, their integrative function within human experience. Art reflects this integrative function in the way it unites and represents previous experiences in man's adjustment to existence (36-7); religion reflects it by enabling man to grasp the import of existence (43). "And since God and Existence mediate and are mediated by the Ideal and the categories of knowledge, the enterprises of ethics and knowledge should be intersected by religion and art to yield entirely new areas where men are and should also be vitally involved (96-7)."

That precisely is the value of the author's essay, namely, its broad perspective in outlining the relations existing between religion and art, and to disclose new areas of service and cooperation. Religion and art are viewed as processes which help man constitute his society and make his collective adjustments to existence.

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The Faith of a Heretic. WALTER KAUFMANN. New York: Doubleday & Co., 1963. Pp. viii, 414.

This book represents a contemporary philosopher's attempt to be shockingly honest about matters of religion and philosophy and to reassert the claims of unique conviction on the part of a modern heretic. In setting forth these claims Walter Kaufmann uses the twin virtues of

honesty and conviction. The heretic has to express himself with a clear 'yes' or 'no' on every specific religious affirmation and exemplify high standards on questions of honesty. However, as it turns out in the case of Walter Kaufmann, honesty means very little else than the right to be opinionated, and conviction means nothing less than the right to be an individualist. Unless something is openly discredited in the fields of theology, suffering, organized religion, morality, and of the Bible, it is regarded by the author as inferior philosophizing.

Although this paperback does not equal his 1958 work, *Critique of Religion and Philosophy*, it does occasionally reveal certain insights which stimulate the reader, as the following quotation indicates: "Some of those who say that every man has an ultimate concern, and that man must have a god, also say that every scientist is a hidden theologian because he is a human being. . . . The stratagem is a *tu quoque* - you are doing it, too. To do justice to its kindly intent, one can call it instead conversion by definition . . . or christen it the bear's hug" (90).

The virtue of nonconformity has a significant place in the method of philosophizing, but it is not the supreme virtue in the discipline. When honesty becomes obtrusive, as it does in *The Faith of a Heretic*, this virtue loses some of its respect among its more disciplined adherents.

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Ethics: The Quest for the Good Life. SAMUEL L. HART. New York: Philosophical Library, 1963. Pp. 127.

Following the Deweyan tradition, the author repudiates the dichotomies between: facts and values, the individual and society, freedom and authority, reason and emotions, heredity and environment, character and conduct, and instrumental and intrinsic values (Pp. 2, 16, 25, 94). Repudiated also is the theory that man's nature is an "unalterable entity, or a clay to be molded or conditioned to any possible design" (p. 19).

By asserting that "the need for ethics stems not so much from the fact that our moral language is vague as from the fact that our desires, aims, and interests conflict" (p. 74), the author rejects the view that linguistic analyses of moral terms *alone* constitute an adequate approach to the solution of ethical problems. Professor Hart points out that "the real problem for ethics is to find means and ways of making the good life into a morally good life, that is, into a shareable experience" (p. 85).

The author conceives the task of ethics to be threefold: "an integration