

The ideas of Quine and Goodman have been admired and discussed, even in insular Britain, both for their intrinsic novelty and for the wit and felicity of their expression. But they have made few converts. Quine's monistic theory of knowledge has been seen as a brilliant paradox, calling for sustained energies of refutation, rather than as the emancipation of philosophy from an undesirable encumbrance. The muted fashion in which it is present in *Word and Object* suggests that its author is not unaffected by this opinion. The defiant austerity of Goodman's position which rejects everything not up to the standards of rigour of Carnap's *Aufbau* as "amorphous philosophical discourses" is even more innocent of the properties lauded by Dale Carnegie.

In this situation there has been something of a vacuum in native American philosophy, one that doctrines established before the war have proved unable to fill. The last major philosophical import was Viennese positivism, many of whose leading exponents settled in the United States in the 1930s. Carnap, Reichenbach and Hempel have had notable effects on the style and interests of American philosophy but the one productive second-generation positivist, Arthur Pap, died young a few years ago. Pragmatism survives only as an ideology for publicists and educators. The realisms, new and critical, of the 1920s and 1930s, whose chief ornaments were Santayana and Lovejoy, are now of only historical interest. At the cultural or literary margin of philosophy there is some concern with existentialism and with its antecedents in nineteenth-century German thought, seen at its best in the writings of Walter Kaufmann, who published an exemplary study of Nietzsche a few years ago and has just brought out a book of translations from and commentary on Hegel, apt for the revival of that thinker prompted by Marxist and Christian revisionism.