

for to Ferguson's relations with the Moderate leadership in the Church of Scotland, and to Ferguson's indebtedness to other contemporaries, such as William Cleghorn, whose originality and influence upon Ferguson have recently been pointed out by Mr. Douglas Nobbs in the *Journal of the History of Ideas*. But this is not an important omission in a book primarily concerned with the exposition of Ferguson's pattern of thought.

Ferguson, for Mr. Kettler, is primarily a teacher of virtue in the Stoic tradition. Unlike Hume and Adam Smith, he believed that moral science was the study of what should be, rather than of what was: "A moral law of nature is . . . an expression not of a fact but of what is good; and is addressed to the powers of estimation and choice." Ferguson saw himself as a professional teacher whose job it was to inculcate a knowledge of virtue in young men destined to occupy a prominent position in society. He attempted to establish firmly in their minds both high moral standards and a confidence that the system under which they lived was both good and right. And though he directed his pupils' attention to a variety of reading, he tried hard to prevent them from being contaminated by those whose views were liable to unsettle the minds of young men, at a time when they should be contemplating their functions and their duties.

Ferguson's teaching had a strongly political flavour, not merely because his audience was composed of those who were going to occupy a prominent position in society (he took it for granted that true virtue was not obtainable by the humble poor), but chiefly because virtue was essentially to be developed in political activity: "It is in conducting the affairs of civil society that mankind find the exercise of their best affections." Nonetheless, Ferguson's political ideas seem to have been little more than a jumble of incompletely worked-out propositions derived from a wide variety of sources. There is a certain interest to be derived from seeing how Ferguson succeeds in dressing up contemporary prejudices in the formal language of the Edinburgh professor—such, for instance, as the comment that "Every person does good, and promotes the happiness of society, by living agreeable to the rank in which providence has placed him . . . whilst from humanity we indulge the poor in their station, we ought from justice to indulge the wealthy in theirs . . ." But there is nothing to raise Ferguson from the lowly rank which the nineteenth century assigned him, along with his equally prosy, and once greatly-admired contemporaries, Millar and Dugald Stewart. If Ferguson is to be revived, it must be as a sociologist, not as a thinker.

H. J. HANHAM

*Hegel: Reinterpretation, texts, and commentary.* By WALTER KAUFMANN. (New York: Doubleday & Co. 1965. Pp. 499. Price \$6.95).

This work provides a good background and valuable documentation for the study of Hegel's philosophical ideas: of those ideas themselves it has, owing to design or lack of profound interest, considerably less to say. This means that a review of it in this journal must necessarily be rather brief, for this is not the place to dilate on Professor Kaufmann's unquestioned scholarship, his biographical flair, or his skill in translating some of the hardest writing in German.

In his preface Professor Kaufmann rightly says that while German commentators have been overinterested in the historical roots and early development of Hegel's thought, British and American commentators have been too little interested in it. But while he deprecates too elaborate an exploration of historical roots, particularly one that dwells too much on Kant, Fichte, Schelling and *a fortiori* on Aristotle, he also deprecates the patient section-by-section commentary which some Anglo-Saxon interpreters have, no doubt inadequately, attempted. The effect of this book is, however, to make one feel, much more strongly than one felt before, that comparatively little light is thrown on Hegel's unique, timeless achievements by the study of historical and personal context, and that intelligent *approfondissement* in the text of his main works is the one source from which great light can be looked for. As I have had occasion to remark elsewhere, Hegel is like Wagner: little understanding accrues to the dateless marvel of the *Ring* by studying *Die Feen* or *Rienzi* or by considering the composer's relation to the King of Bavaria or Mathilde Wesendonck. But the intelligent *approfondissement* I am in quest of is possibly well on its way in the detailed commentary on the *Phenomenology* which some members of the Hegel Verein are now undertaking, and when their work appears Professor Kaufmann's study will help to provide background for the new material.

In the first chapter Kaufmann relates Hegel to that brilliant literary background with which Anglo-Saxon commentators tend to be imperfectly familiar, the background of the early writings of Goethe (particularly *Iphigeneia* and *Wilhelm Meister*), of Schiller and his *Aesthetic Education of Man*, of Rousseau, of the Schlegels, etc. He points out

how indirect and relatively slight was the influence of Kant's First Critique on Hegel's early development, and how much more he was influenced by Kant's ethico-religious theorizing. It is very valuable to have it pointed out how a distinction much like that of reason and understanding in Hegel is anticipated in Goethe, and how the locutions *ausser sich sein*, *bei sich sein*, *in sich gehen*, and even *aufheben* are sometimes given a slant quite like that of Hegel's in the essays of Schiller. The very fact that Hegel so often quotes poetic passages from Goethe and Schiller has in fact always shown how greatly the fluid dynamism of his dialectic had its roots in the semi-philosophical thought of the time. Hegel's profoundly critical attitude to the man Jesus in his early writings is also valuably stressed: this, as Kaufmann shows, is an attitude which Hegel never radically revised.

In Chapter II Kaufmann gives interesting sketches of Hegel's early published writings, the *Differenzschrift*, the dissertation on the orbits of the planets, the five interesting articles contributed to the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*. It is valuable to be reminded of the occurrence of the utterance 'God is dead' in the article 'Faith and Knowledge', an utterance echoed in the *Phenomenology* and afterwards by Nietzsche, and which represents the understressed atheistic component in his absolutism, whose theistic component always enjoyed official emphasis.

In Chapter III Kaufmann deals with Hegel's *Phenomenology*, very interestingly but also largely from a biographical and literary angle. "The Second Part of *Faust* and Hegel's *Phenomenology* are the creations of men as lonely as the exiled poet of the *Divine Comedy*. Hegel, like Goethe and Dante, created a world of his own, and instead of peopling it largely with figments of his imagination as many another author has done, found places in it for the men and women and events he knew from history and literature, as well as a very few of his contemporaries—and did not care how much of all this would be recognized and understood." Goethe's development, says Professor Kaufmann, suggested to Hegel "that there was a 'logical' sequence—not 'logical' in the ordinary sense but rather in the way in which, to use a Hegelian image, bud, blossom and fruit succeed each other". This idea, says Kaufmann, is "supremely suggestive and fascinating but, in the end, untenable" and "any attempt to relate all points of view in a single chain of this sort is bound to be at best a virtuosic performance . . . at worst a waste of time. The transitions of the *Phenomenology* fluctuate from one extreme to the other." It seems to me that these comments, if they represented the whole truth about Hegel's *Phenomenology*—they certainly represent part of the truth about it—would entirely destroy its value. The transitions in the *Phenomenology*, like all Hegel's dialectical transitions, seem to me to involve valuable *higher-order comment* on what has gone before, comment that is often deeply true of what went before, though it does not trivially follow from it, and Hegel does slant all his comments towards an ultimate interpretative stance in terms of *das absolute Wissen*, which I for one find surpassingly illuminating. Is a method which rises from insight to insight to be despised merely because—what would in any case be impossible—one cannot trivially deduce its later insights from its earlier ones? Just as Hume's fantastic account of causation has become for many philosophers the normal meaning of the term 'cause', so, it would seem, the sense of 'logic' connected with symbolic manipulations has usurped the place of any other more deeply significant use.

Chapter IV of Professor Kaufmann's work is devoted to the circumstances in which Hegel composed his *Wissenschaft der Logik*, and to a somewhat summary treatment of its contents. Kaufmann rightly points out that Hegel did not believe in a single inexorable order in which the various thought-stances of the logic have to be arranged. This is plainly shown by the differences between his two treatments of the subject-matter of Logic, and by the lack of an attempt to bring them into line with one another. It is also quite plain, as Professor Kaufmann shows, that the picture of Thesis-Anti-thesis-Synthesis as the method of Hegel is a legendary stereotype. But it is quite a different thing to maintain, as Kaufmann maintains, that Hegel "kept accumulating material and ideas and then faced the terrible problem of writing an orderly book" and that his sequence of categories involves "no relentless ascent from being to the absolute" but "rather an attempt to organize an excess of material". What is here maintained seems to me simply false: the material *has* throughout an order of deep logical relevance, each new category arguably bringing out something which its predecessor implied but did not explicitly bring out, even though the same material could sometimes have been differently ordered with an equal degree of profound relevance. Even rigorously deductive chains can take a variety of alternative courses, and the same ought obviously to be true of Hegel's looser logic. In neither case need the logical mean the "relentless". I have in fact found that, as I studied Hegel over the years, the impression of sheer arbitrariness in many Hegelian transitions has been increasingly dissipated, and I hope ultimately to see the full point of them all. If this were not so, I should not think Hegel worthy of continued study: I should rank him with many plausible reasoners whose appearance of coherence melts away on closer examination.

As regards Kaufmann's view that the end of the Logic is not meant to represent an absolute, a truly all-explanatory culmination, I would simply refer him to the statement in the *Encyclopaedia* (§ 85) that all the categories may be regarded as metaphysical definitions of the Absolute, as well as the statement in *Enc.* § 213, that "die Definition des Absoluten, dass es die Idee ist, ist nun selbst absolut". That there is another "absolute" which occurs at a previous point in the Objective Logic is irrelevant. I should myself further say that, as absolutes go, Hegel's is the best-formed, most viable and logically potent of them all. If one is seeking for a single self-explanatory, all-explanatory concept to which all other notions point back or forward, the notion of an Idea which is "das ewige Anschauen ihrer selbst im Andern" (*Enc.* § 214), and which develops into a Geist which involves a necessary internal discrepancy between concept and reality "in order that, by overcoming that discrepancy, it may have and know freedom as its conscious essence, and be absolutely manifest" (*Enc.* § 386) is arguably superior, in virtue of its requirement of opposition and contingent individualization, to Water, Fire, the Platonic Good, the God of Aquinas, the Substance of Spinoza, the Matter of Helvétius, the Logical Space of Wittgenstein or any other of the long line of absolutes from the need for which philosophy has never really freed itself. (I apologize for the Hegelian length of this sentence.) Possibly Professor Kaufmann would not disagree, but I find it hard to think that he does not have a low opinion of Hegel's Idea when he describes the section of the Logic which deals with it as "the place for any left-overs—much as a speaker, groping for a conclusion after an unusually long talk, looks for a few high-sounding and noble words that will make a good ending. So Hegel brings in life and knowledge, the true and the good . . ." (p. 223).

Chapter V deals with the *Encyclopaedia* and discusses, among other things, the reliability of its *Zusätze* as well as that of other Hegelian texts based on lecture notes. That the *Zusätze* have undergone much doctoring and face-lifting, some of which can now never be undone, is of course incontestable: not so the recommendation that the *Zusätze* should have been given the miserable title of 'The Wit and Wisdom of Hegel, in Quotations from his Lectures'. Professor Kaufmann may be so happy as to be able to interpret all the published paragraphs of the *Encyclopaedia* without the assistance of the *Zusätze*: I myself, and many others, have derived inestimable light from them. It would, I think, often be as difficult to interpret Hegel's paragraphs without them as it would be to interpret the pre-Socratic fragments without doxographic help. But it is of course to be hoped that the Hegel Archiv will sort them all out as well as may be possible, and distinguish their varying strata. The following statement of Professor Kaufmann is so extreme that it takes my breath away: "The central point of our philological excursus is, of course, to show how Hegel himself handled his system: not as so much necessary truth, deduced once and for all in its inexorable sequence, but rather as a very neat and sensible way of arranging the parts of philosophy—not even the neatest and most sensible possible, but only the best he could do in time to meet the printer's deadline" (p. 249). Whatever the arrangement of the *Encyclopaedia* may be, it cannot be called neat and sensible: only the plea that it is supremely profound and illuminating—though not inexorably consequential—could make it worth anyone's while to master its intricacies.

Chapter VI, 'Hegel on History', is vivid and varied, and does valuable work in destroying the baseless Kierkegaardian image of Hegel. But it contains a (to me) repugnant comparison of Hegel with Nietzsche; this, while it explains why Professor Kaufmann admires Hegel in spite of what he thinks of his systematic insights, to me connects a philosopher whom I admire above all others with one who I have never felt merited close study at all. Chapter VII brings Hegel's heavy humanity to life in well-selected letters to and from and about him. But Chapter VIII is the most worthwhile part of the book, a really luminous translation of the Preface to the *Phenomenology*, with comments that are most helpful, and that show deep understanding and sympathy at points where what Kaufmann elsewhere says would not lead one to expect understanding and sympathy from him at all. Possibly Kaufmann understands Hegel very much better than he cares to show, but from some vantage-point of an empiricism or scepticism alien to me, from which Hegel's systematic contentions seem easily seen through and hardly worth taking apart. Though I disagree profoundly with Professor Kaufmann on countless issues of interpretation and evaluation, I must in conclusion repeat that this book is a mine of valuable information and lively comment.

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*Husserl und Kant: Eine Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus.* By ISO KERN. *Phaenomenologica*, 16. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 1964. Pp. xxiv + 448. Price Gld. 36).

The author intends to give a historical and systematic analysis of Husserl's position