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with a response that is something like fear but also something like daring (or, something like hope and yet something like despondency)" (p. 218).

Part of the problem is that Klubertanz is saddled with an unnecessary jargon. For example: "In summary, then, a *habit* (in general) is a quality which determines an operative power which is in some sense indeterminate, so that an ordered operation flows from that power with ease, consistency, and pleasure" (p. 101). This jargon leads him into empty explanations of the "dormitive virtue" type, as in his explanation of how an intention can remain effective for a long time, without being expressed even to oneself: "the human intellect, once it has an actual understanding, is never again reduced to simple potency concerning that object" (p. 172).

Nevertheless, the subject is an interesting one. A good philosophical treatment of virtue is sorely needed.

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HEGEL: REINTERPRETATION, TEXTS AND COMMENTARY.

By WALTER KAUFMANN. New York, Doubleday & Co., 1965. Pp. 498. \$6.95.

Mr. Kaufmann's aim is to counter the common view of Hegel as an "archrationalist" (p. 164), a "desiccated professor who eked out a book at a time by ceaselessly applying a mechanical method" (p. 215), an unreasoning "optimist" in his view of history (pp. 257-258), a "statist and totalitarian" in politics (p. 273). His method is to examine Hegel's background and intellectual biography, concentrating on such evidence as throws light on his temperament and the circumstances in which his works were produced. The results will certainly surprise some readers. For it emerges that Hegel was no dry-as-dust pedant, but both a man of feeling and a man who laid stress on feeling, as might have been expected of a close friend of the poet Hölderlin. So far from being smooth and complacent, he was in some ways a deeply unhappy character, whose life was more disorganized than tidy. His first major work was rushed out in circumstances which were distressing, for as well as being harassed by the French at Jena, Hegel was beset by personal doubts, difficulties, and obligations, including the impending birth of an illegitimate child. The pretense he made at this time to being "scientific" is ludicrously

at variance with his actual achievement: the *Phenomenology* is “undisciplined, arbitrary, full of digressions, not a monument to the austerity of the intellectual conscience and to carefulness and precision, but a wild, bold, unprecedented book that invites comparison with some great literary masterpieces” (p. 171). Much that we find there was put in “just because it happened then to be of interest to the writer,” and not for any systematic reason. But it is a mistake in any case to imagine that, even in his later writings, Hegel was a slave to a pre-existing triadic form. The very fact that he made so many changes in the divisions of the *Encyclopaedia* for its different editions is evidence against the view, while the preface to the *Phenomenology* already underlines Hegel’s antipathy to any formal application of a dialectical scheme. It was, admittedly, his ambition to show that there is reason in things, but we can take this as meaning no more, or not much more, than that they are not the product of pure chance. This is true, for instance, of his philosophy of history, which shows that “there is *some* reason in the madness of history, and [that] the suffering is not wholly pointless” (p. 265), but does not therefore set it aside as unreal. On this as on other matters Hegel has been much misrepresented: who would think when they see him denounced as a totalitarian that one of his favorite literary works was Sophocles’ *Antigone*, “which is a song of songs on civil disobedience” (p. 273)?

To document his interpretation Kaufmann adds translations of a number of letters to, from, or about Hegel as well as other relevant papers. He also produces a new and improved translation of the preface to the *Phenomenology*, with an accompanying commentary. And he gives useful accounts of the contents of Hegel’s first published writings (in the *Critical Journal of Philosophy*, [1802-1803]), which illustrate many of his views in the making, as well as explaining the structure of the *Phenomenology* and the *Science of Logic* at some length and discussing the subject matter and authenticity of some of the posthumously published lectures. Finally, he completes the book with a bibliography which is especially valuable for the clear way in which it details Hegel’s individual works and their various versions and makes plain just what is and what is not available in English translation.

Kaufmann’s book is lively, readable, and instructive; it will be surprising if it is not widely admired and if it does not provoke interest in its subject. It is, however, a work which is more successful in setting the scene for an understanding of Hegel’s philosophy than in offering a fresh interpretation in the full sense of the term. For even if everything Kaufmann argues for is correct, we are still left with the

question what to make of Hegel's own philosophical aspirations. On this point Kaufmann is surely too cavalier. However loose Hegel's application of the dialectic turned out to be in practice, we can scarcely take him as having set down no more than a series of intriguing thoughts, put together on the principle that they attracted his interest at the time. To do that would indeed be to make him a literary figure, at the expense of forgetting that he saw himself as a philosopher. It would also ignore certain central and pervasive features of his thought. For even if, as Kaufmann insists, the thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern is, so far as Hegel is concerned, a commentator's myth, the fact remains that he was deeply committed, both in the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic*, to the notions of *order* and *development*: there is a sense in which he believed the different stages in each case to be one and all *necessary*. Kaufmann does nothing to explicate that sense; he simply dismisses Hegel's talk of necessity as confused. He ought surely to have asked himself if the connections within the Hegelian system might not be understood in terms of some other type of necessity, as Findlay did when he tried to explicate them by reference to aesthetic coherence. Failing that, he offers the student useful help of an external kind in tackling the principal works, but no real insight into what Hegel was attempting. Nor does he give the detailed guidance about individual passages which is available in Findlay and Mure, except in his commentary on the preface to the *Phenomenology*. A jaundiced student might even think that Kaufmann is so taken up with the variations between one Hegelian edition and another that he forgets to tell the reader what the whole discussion is about. And this result is the more to be regretted when one observes that he can explain Hegel's difficult ideas with admirable lucidity, as he does, for example, in discussing the famous triad Being-Nothing-Becoming at the beginning of the *Science of Logic*.

If Kaufmann has another fault, it is that he pitches his own claims too high and correspondingly takes a low view of the work of his fellow commentators. His "reinterpretation," after all, is not quite new: something like it has been available in German since 1905, in French since 1929. Even in English some, though not all, of its main points can be found in Kroner's introduction to Knox's translation of the early theological writings. As for his predecessors, Kaufmann complains first that British and American scholars mostly concentrate on the Hegelian logic at the expense of studying what led up to it, and then that Royce, of whom this is conspicuously not true, was careless in his quotations and sometimes wildly wrong in his interpretation.

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He does not add that Royce gives a penetrating survey of large parts of Hegel's most baffling work, nor indicate the extent to which a beginner can profit from Royce's *Lectures* as he can from scarcely anything else on the subject. Similarly, he denounces Wallace for having called his translation of Part I of the *Encyclopaedia* "The Logic of Hegel," without mentioning that Wallace added in his second edition an introduction which sets out the facts about the three editions of the *Encyclopaedia* and its relation to the *Science of Logic* in detail and with complete clarity, and which incidentally makes several references to Hegel's intellectual development as evidenced in his letters and first published works. Nor do I understand how Kaufmann can say that Wallace rendered Hegel "badly" (p. 198), unless it is a mark of badness in a translation that a clumsy and difficult author is made to speak in an idiomatic and relatively intelligible way.

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STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE: SECOND SERIES. Edited by EDWARD C. MOORE and RICHARD C. ROBIN. Amherst, The University of Massachusetts Press, 1964. Pp. 525. \$8.50.

This substantial volume contains twenty-six essays and two appendices, mostly by old Peirce hands, on quite a variety of subjects. Since a number of central topics in Peirce's philosophy have been intensively worked over in recent years, it is not surprising that some of them (for example, pragmatism) are relatively unrepresented. But Peirce scholars will find much information and stimulation here, as I hope the following summary will indicate.

The book opens with Max H. Fisch's "Was There a Metaphysical Club in Cambridge?," an admirable historical performance in which he reviews the various accounts Peirce gave of the Club as well as the evidence that is independent of Peirce's testimony, and concludes that the Club did exist, beginning in 1871, and that Peirce did read to the Club in November, 1872, a paper containing "the most essential part" of "The Fixation of Belief" and perhaps some of "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." There are other conclusions concerning such matters as the membership of the Club, the topics discussed at its meetings, and the intellectual influences on Peirce in his development of the formula of pragmatism. Fisch is responsible also for two valuable