

deals with the traditional problems of the field and delineates his views as to the nature of knowledge and true opinion, and the distinction between direct and indirect evidence.

He devotes a lively and stimulating chapter to "The Problem of the Criterion". How can we know that something that seems to be true or good or right, really is so; that something that seems to be a veridical perception is trustworthy; that something that seems to be a reliable memory is such; that our inference from the physical or speech behavior of another person to a judgment as to his beliefs or attitudes is correct?

Analogous difficulties arise in trying to justify our claims to analytic a priori knowledge or the truths of reason, Chisholm urges. To recognize even an analytic statement to be necessarily true we must know either something about the use of linguistic expressions or about the relations of the referents of those expressions.

In his discussion of appearances, Chisholm adopts an adverbial theory: e.g., a person perceiving an elephant, say, may be appeared to grayly or loudly or heavily or long-tuskily, or, perhaps, even elephantly. And strangely enough he prefers such locutions to sensing grayness or loudness or tuskness, etc. On his theory we do not observe sensations or sense qualities but rather instances of modes of being appeared to. In addition to the awkwardness of such expressions it seems *prima-facie* false to hold that we are aware of modes of appearing rather than of sense qualities.

In his closing chapter, on truth, Chisholm proposes this: "A belief or assertion is true provided, first, that it is a belief or assertion with respect to a certain state of affairs, that that state of affairs exists, and provided, secondly, that that state of affairs does exist. . . . And *a truth*, finally, is a state of affairs that exists." (103-4.) This seems to neglect the distinction between a possible state of affairs which may be conceived, and an actual state of affairs which exemplifies that concept.

CHARLES A. BAYLIS.

DUKE UNIVERSITY.

Hegel. Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary. WALTER KAUFMANN. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1965. Pp. 498.

Hegel's Phenomenology. Dialogues on the Life of Mind. J. LOEWENBERG. La Salle, Ill.: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1965. Pp. xv, 377.

What Madison Avenue did for the Volkswagen, Walter Kaufmann had done in his *Nietzsche* (1950). He had rendered acceptable to a

reluctant public a philosophical oddity which had the motor in the back when everything else had it in front. With his *Hegel*, Kaufmann is trying to do something similar for a tank, and his book succeeds in making some lethal parts of the tank look like comfortable chairs or as if they were not there at all. Gossipy and talkative, a little disorganized, in love with itself, forgetful and repetitious, prejudiced and not exactly guileless, the book has the charm of all these little vices. It is also a book of considerable scholarship. Above all, it is an attempt at reinterpreting the philosophy of Hegel and, more successfully, at presenting Hegel's life and person.

Given the analytic interest in the philosophies of Leibniz and Kant, some analysts might rediscover the post-Kantian climaxes of these continental attempts at bringing together the Christian verities and the truths of science. Kaufmann himself would not be unsympathetic to the analytic approach. He tunes down Hegel's conception of the *Logic* and sees it as an analysis of categories replacing speculative metaphysics; and occasionally he criticizes Hegel as an analyst might (262). Yet it is fair to say that he prefers to view Hegel from a standpoint which could be described as mini-existentialism, minex for short. Minex has divested itself of all romanticisms except one: it conceives of philosophy as diagnosis and therapy, in the medium of concepts, of human alienation. Whatever one may think of minex, it is itself an echo of a strong Hegelian chord, that of Reason overcoming the intellectual schisms of mind and matter, subject and object, the infinite and the finite, etc. Kaufmann's contribution is to remind us of the tortured and alienated Hegel himself, torn as he was between antagonistic value commitments, Greek, Kantian, and Christian (the latter unduly underplayed by Kaufmann) and for too many years searching in vain for fulfillment in his personal, intellectual, and professional life. Another, not unrelated, way of viewing Hegel's philosophy is to view it as a work of art, as Heym had suggested. Kaufmann stresses the impact on Hegel of Schiller's *Aesthetic Education of Mankind*, of Sophocles' *Antigone* and Goethe's *Iphigenie*, and there are many more passages of a similar nature. The one element still missing is a detailed analysis of Hegel's style of thinking which seems to employ a use of concepts that is artistic rather than philosophic. Anyhow, Kaufmann himself turns out once more to be a fine artist in his translation of the Preface of the *Phenomenology* and of documents selected for the support they give to Kaufmann's re-view of Hegel. A very informative bibliography in the form of a *catalogue raisonné* concludes this book on a Teutonic tank.

Loewenberg's work is limited to a straight interpretation of the *Phenomenology*: he is not interested in connecting, à la minex, Hegel's

thoughts with Hegel's troubles, nor in locating the *Phenomenology* within Hegel's oeuvre. In fact, Loewenberg makes fun of scholarship, which seems to have upset some Hegel scholars (cf. *Philosophical Review*, July 1967, p. 390). The main purpose of the book is to assist the reader of the *Phenomenology* in understanding those parts of it that Loewenberg, with fine modesty, believes to have understood. The famous Preface does not seem to be among them. To Loewenberg, the *Phenomenology* gives "a synoptic view of the multiform career" of the major persuasions, or postures, of mankind. In the earlier chapters Loewenberg sticks to an enlightening analogy which he abandons later. He describes the first step of Hegel's procedure in the *Phenomenology* in analogy with "histrionic impersonation": we are to identify ourselves with a certain general type of human persuasion, say, sense certainty. And he describes the second step in analogy with the character comedian: we are made to discover how comic this kind of persuasion is, how it comes to contradict its own internal norms and standards. I find this analogy suggestive because it draws attention to Hegel, the artist. If one compares Loewenberg's book with some other interpretations of the *Phenomenology* such as Kojève's or Bloch's, Loewenberg's seems to me to come out best. Loewenberg gives us some honest-to-goodness, old-fashioned, somewhat Roycean metal while Kojève and Bloch give us mainly foam artificially gilded in the language of their respective idols, Heidegger and Marx.

Loewenberg presents his book in the form of a dialogue between a magisterial Hegel-lover and a youthful and skeptical Hegel critic. They compliment each other incessantly, and do so in a prose style as swinging as an Idaho potato. "The more a language departs from its natural or spontaneous base by becoming artificial and staid and fastidious, the deeper the estrangement between the self holding converse with himself and the self involved in overt discourse" (221). Loewenberg's two selves must be extraordinarily far apart. However, there is fun in listening to a voice from the past that is so staid and fastidious.

WALTER CERF.

CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK.

The Philosophy of Marxism: An Exposition. JOHN SOMERVILLE, New York: Random House, 1967. Pp. vi, 214.

To this reviewer this paperback original is one of the most lucid and persuasive books on Marxism written in the U. S. Designed to elucidate