

deals with the traditional problems of the field and delineates his views as to the nature of knowledge and true opinion, and the distinction between direct and indirect evidence.

He devotes a lively and stimulating chapter to "The Problem of the Criterion". How can we know that something that seems to be true or good or right, really is so; that something that seems to be a veridical perception is trustworthy; that something that seems to be a reliable memory is such; that our inference from the physical or speech behavior of another person to a judgment as to his beliefs or attitudes is correct?

Analogous difficulties arise in trying to justify our claims to analytic a priori knowledge or the truths of reason, Chisholm urges. To recognize even an analytic statement to be necessarily true we must know either something about the use of linguistic expressions or about the relations of the referents of those expressions.

In his discussion of appearances, Chisholm adopts an adverbial theory: e.g., a person perceiving an elephant, say, may be appeared to grayly or loudly or heavily or long-tuskily, or, perhaps, even elephantly. And strangely enough he prefers such locutions to sensing grayness or loudness or tuskness, etc. On his theory we do not observe sensations or sense qualities but rather instances of modes of being appeared to. In addition to the awkwardness of such expressions it seems *prima-facie* false to hold that we are aware of modes of appearing rather than of sense qualities.

In his closing chapter, on truth, Chisholm proposes this: "A belief or assertion is true provided, first, that it is a belief or assertion with respect to a certain state of affairs, that that state of affairs exists, and provided, secondly, that that state of affairs does exist. . . . And *a truth*, finally, is a state of affairs that exists." (103-4.) This seems to neglect the distinction between a possible state of affairs which may be conceived, and an actual state of affairs which exemplifies that concept.

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*Hegel. Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary.* WALTER KAUFMANN. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1965. Pp. 498.

*Hegel's Phenomenology. Dialogues on the Life of Mind.* J. LOEWENBERG. La Salle, Ill.: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1965. Pp. xv, 377.

What Madison Avenue did for the Volkswagen, Walter Kaufmann had done in his *Nietzsche* (1950). He had rendered acceptable to a

reluctant public a philosophical oddity which had the motor in the back when everything else had it in front. With his *Hegel*, Kaufmann is trying to do something similar for a tank, and his book succeeds in making some lethal parts of the tank look like comfortable chairs or as if they were not there at all. Gossipy and talkative, a little disorganized, in love with itself, forgetful and repetitious, prejudiced and not exactly guileless, the book has the charm of all these little vices. It is also a book of considerable scholarship. Above all, it is an attempt at reinterpreting the philosophy of Hegel and, more successfully, at presenting Hegel's life and person.

Given the analytic interest in the philosophies of Leibniz and Kant, some analysts might rediscover the post-Kantian climaxes of these continental attempts at bringing together the Christian verities and the truths of science. Kaufmann himself would not be unsympathetic to the analytic approach. He tunes down Hegel's conception of the *Logic* and sees it as an analysis of categories replacing speculative metaphysics; and occasionally he criticizes Hegel as an analyst might (262). Yet it is fair to say that he prefers to view Hegel from a standpoint which could be described as mini-existentialism, minex for short. Minex has divested itself of all romanticisms except one: it conceives of philosophy as diagnosis and therapy, in the medium of concepts, of human alienation. Whatever one may think of minex, it is itself an echo of a strong Hegelian chord, that of Reason overcoming the intellectual schisms of mind and matter, subject and object, the infinite and the finite, etc. Kaufmann's contribution is to remind us of the tortured and alienated Hegel himself, torn as he was between antagonistic value commitments, Greek, Kantian, and Christian (the latter unduly underplayed by Kaufmann) and for too many years searching in vain for fulfillment in his personal, intellectual, and professional life. Another, not unrelated, way of viewing Hegel's philosophy is to view it as a work of art, as Heym had suggested. Kaufmann stresses the impact on Hegel of Schiller's *Aesthetic Education of Mankind*, of Sophocles' *Antigone* and Goethe's *Iphigenie*, and there are many more passages of a similar nature. The one element still missing is a detailed analysis of Hegel's style of thinking which seems to employ a use of concepts that is artistic rather than philosophic. Anyhow, Kaufmann himself turns out once more to be a fine artist in his translation of the Preface of the *Phenomenology* and of documents selected for the support they give to Kaufmann's re-view of Hegel. A very informative bibliography in the form of a *catalogue raisonné* concludes this book on a Teutonic tank.

Loewenberg's work is limited to a straight interpretation of the *Phenomenology*: he is not interested in connecting, à la minex, Hegel's

