

und Schönheit' as 'die Grundlage dieser Sicht der Seienden', but apparently restricts *καλόν*, etc., to 'Schönheit'.) Another conclusion is that mankind can attain to *σοφία* because *ψυχή* and the cosmos both have fire as their 'Grundsubstanz'. Gladigow relates Heraclitus' harmony of opposites to earlier Greek thought; and he seems rather, though all the earlier history is much in point, to underestimate Heraclitus' originality, or possibly merely to devote an inadequate amount of space to the question.

Aeschylus (x) is presented as the last of the old epoch, the first of the new. For him, knowledge and action are sharply opposed: in the *P.V.* Prometheus knows but cannot act, while Zeus acts but does not know; and Cassandra in the *Oresteia* is in a similar position to Prometheus. (Can this have been entirely new in Aeschylus' day? Any society which contains seers, and myths and legends including seers, is not unlikely to have stories of seers who, though they know the future, are for some reason unable to affect it.) Gladigow also holds that Aeschylus' ideal is *σωφρονεῖν*, and that he set his face against 'ein "theoretisches" Wissen'. Our evidence for the latter is fr. 390 N²; but it is possible to know many things which are not *χρήσιμα* but which are nevertheless not theoretical; and a one-line fragment spoken by an unidentifiable character leaves us no means of estimating Aeschylus' own view of the words uttered. (To say this leaves open the question of Aeschylus' attitude to theoretical knowledge.)

Gladigow attempts to present the *σοφός* in pre-philosophical times as the person who sees the relationship of what he is doing to the whole (74), whether he be craftsman, poet, or statesman: 'σοφίη ist immer ein Wissen, das die Stellung des Einzelnen im Ganzen erkennt und es bewußt in diese Ordnung einfügt.' Thus far, any purposive and intelligent activity would appear to be *σοφόν*; but the author wishes to include the Greek poet's portrayal of the relationship between man and god as a manifestation of his *σοφία*. (Doubtless, but has Gladigow shown that the early Greek would not have termed a skilful poet *σοφός* merely because he was skilful?) The theme is developed in the Nachwort, after the discussion of Heraclitus and Aeschylus: *κόσμος*, the order of things as they are, is a correlate of *σοφία* in Heraclitus, and to be *σοφός* is 'sich in diesen Kosmos einzuordnen'. The title of the work would suggest that Gladigow attaches great importance to the link between *σοφία* and *κόσμος* throughout; but in the first part of the book 'order' has to be so broadly interpreted that very little is being said (and the semantic history of *κόσμος* is not pursued at all). Nevertheless, the details of the argument relating to individual writers are interesting; though it is perhaps regrettable that the work ends with Heraclitus and Aeschylus, just at the point where thinkers are beginning to make statements which bear directly on the question under discussion.

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A NEW POETICS

WALTER KAUFMANN: *Tragedy and Philosophy*. Pp. xvii+388. New York: Doubleday, 1968. Cloth, \$6.95.

IN this lengthy and wide-ranging book the Professor of Philosophy at Princeton adds one more to the long line of discussions of the theory of tragedy, while

at the same time he takes a critical look at his predecessors, from Plato and Aristotle through to Nietzsche, Hegel, Bradley, and the rest. His aim is to construct 'a new poetics': 'to develop a sound and fruitful approach to tragedy, try it out, and thus illuminate Greek tragedy and some problems relating to the possibility and actuality of tragedy in our time.' He recognizes that all this is just a matter of the use of words. 'There is no essence of the tragic or the philosophical. There are merely different ways of using these terms.' He admits that the assumption that all tragedies are of one type 'has done a good deal of damage'. Nevertheless, he apparently assumes that the search for a new theory of tragedy is a worthwhile enterprise. (A question he does not consider, incidentally, is why so much more ink has been spilt on the theory of tragedy than on theories of comedy. Is it because *Poetics* ii was lost? The thought tempts one to irreverent reflection on what we might have been spared if Book i had been lost as well.)

Kaufmann starts from a brief sketch of the approach to poetry in the *Republic* and the *Laws*, including the interesting suggestion that the Myth of Er is intended as 'an example of the kind of poetry permitted and needed in the ideal city'. His chapter on the *Poetics* starts by discussing the definition of tragedy: 'ruth and terror' should replace 'pity and fear' in our translations, and Aristotle's meaning is that tragedy 'evokes a sense of profound suffering approximating terror, in such a way that the spectators experience a sobering emotional relief'. The weakness of the *Poetics* as a whole is its concentration on form and technique rather than substance, a tendency followed in recent decades by 'vast multitudes of literary critics'—'a source of livelihood for a mushrooming industry'. That Aristotle concentrates on the form of tragedy may be granted; but Kaufmann's account is superficial in that it almost ignores what is surely the central feature of Aristotle's discussion—his emphasis on unity and the necessary connection between the parts of the whole.

Kaufmann himself has no intention of joining the 'mushrooming industry' of current fashion in literary criticism. In Chapter iii, 'Toward a New Poetics', he deals first with the question of form by putting forward his own definition, including the key statement that tragedy 'moves into the center immense human suffering'. But to this 'artistic dimension', he says, others, absent in the *Poetics* and in most modern critical writing, must be added: the 'historical dimension', in which a play is examined in its biographical and historical context; and the 'philosophical dimension', concerned with a work's content or thought. Kaufmann rightly condemns the practice of regarding dramatists as philosophers, but it is the 'philosophical dimension' of their plays that chiefly interests him, and to this, with varying success, he devotes the rest of his book.

The value of his approach in discussing a single play is well shown in a perceptive chapter on the *Oedipus Tyrannus*, in which he finds five central themes: man's radical insecurity; human blindness; the curse of honesty; the problem of justice; and the inevitability of tragedy. Oedipus' unavoidable dilemma is that he must unearth the truth or else fail to deliver his people from the plague; if with Kitto we point out that the plague is forgotten after the opening scenes, Kaufmann claims that the dilemma must have been obvious to the Athenian audience, whose recent experience of plague made it something they could not forget.

On this and other particular plays, and on tragedy in general, Kaufmann

has many good things to say. He rightly sees the *Iliad* as the birthplace of tragedy. His restatement and defence of Hegel's view is admirable: Hegel realized 'that at the center of the greatest tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles [and Kaufmann adds the *Bacchae* and the *Hippolytus*] we find not a tragic hero but a tragic collision, and that the conflict is not between good and evil but between one-sided positions, each of which embodies some good'. But much of his lengthy discussion of the Greek tragic poets and Shakespeare leaves the reader wondering whether generalized treatment of drama's 'philosophical dimension' may not do more harm than good. His chapter on Sophocles, for example, decries Aristotle's emphasis on his skill in plot-making as 'amazingly imperceptive and unprofound', and rejects the 'serene cheerfulness' which Nietzsche found in him, but replaces it with another generalization: Sophocles is 'the poet of heroic despair'. The keynote for all his plays is set by the *Ajax*: 'The gods are brutal, but a human being can rise to such heights of nobility that he puts the gods to shame.' The pages that follow have some success in attaching the same label to the *Antigone* and the *Trachiniae*, but fail when they come to the *Electra*, the *Philoctetes*, and the *Oedipus Coloneus*. Looking back to the separate treatment of the *Oedipus Tyrannus* earlier in the book, one feels that generalization is a hindrance, not a help, to Kaufmann's valuable insight into particular plays.

For the Nietzsche and Steiner theories of the 'death of tragedy' Kaufmann has no use. The notion that tragedy could not survive the optimism of faith in reason or faith in Christianity is proved false from the first, he holds, by the optimism of Aeschylus, the most optimistic of all the tragic poets. On the contrary, 'neither in Athens nor in our time has tragedy perished of optimism: its sickness unto death was and is despair'. This was the trend from Aeschylus through to Euripides and beyond, so that eventually New Comedy replaced tragedy; for 'tragedy is generally more optimistic than comedy'. So in our own time 'it is profound despair that leads most of the generation born during and after World War II to feel that tragedy is dated; they prefer comedy, whether black or not. Tragedy is inspired by a faith that can weather the plague, whether in Sophoclean Athens or in Elizabethan London, but not Auschwitz.' Looking in the mid twentieth century for drama worthy of the name of tragedy, Kaufmann rejects Sartre as a playwright who has no wish to evoke ruth and terror but prefers to offer fare for thought, and finds the same true at a lower level of Brecht, whom he attacks at some length. His own choice as a modern writer of tragedy is Hochhuth; and his pages on *The Deputy* and *Soldiers* are some of the most interesting in the book.

In reviewing a book of such wide range and interest it would be pedantic to complain of the few points of detail on which author or printer seems to go astray. But in a second edition *multum in parva* and *parvum in multa* (p. 303) should be corrected; and in view of our present knowledge of the fifth-century theatre it would be as well to abandon the suggestion (p. 53) that Philocles may have defeated Sophocles by putting on a play with 'a stunning set'.