nology there were no adolescents and no delinquents. Rather, Foucault's view is that the social status of the madman, delinquent, patient, worker, child, pupil, and woman was fundamentally different before it was allowed representation in a scientific field of knowing. With the emergence of the human sciences which are at once systems of knowing and systems of power, we have produced different modes of thinking and knowing that have essentially altered our conceptions about man—the way that we think about ourselves and each other. It is this mode of perceiving our shared social responsibilities that *Discipline and Punish* so clearly illuminates and is so significant to understanding the articulation between school and society and the service of the teacher.

The Future of the Humanities by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Reader's Digest Press, distributed by Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1977. xxi+226 pp. $8.95.

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Insisting that the humanities are in a shambles, branding education in the humanities a failure, avoiding for the sake of brevity all of the literature on higher education, ignoring the noteworthy attempts of his contemporaries to deal with the same issues (e.g., James Jarrett, A. W. Levi, Richard McKeon)—Walter Kaufmann may easily infuriate the very readers his book is meant to edify. But behind the provocative rhetoric are substantial, if not consistently arresting, insights for teachers of the humanities.

Unfortunately, it is not always easy to tell if apparently useful insights are substantial or not, since they are largely unsubstantiated. Kaufmann proceeds stipulatively from point to point, shunning footnotes and, often, supporting arguments in favor of personal illustrations. I suspect that he is counting on a long-standing and well-deserved reputation for excellent scholarly work to shore up the reader's confidence in his "vision" of the humanities.[1]

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The book is divided into six chapters and a prologue which, taken together, are intended to convey a concise, coherent view of the humanities and their place in higher education. In the prologue, Kaufmann not only raises the question of what the humanities are but also discloses the reasons for teaching them. The dust jacket's subtitle (evidently a publisher's invention since it is nowhere in the book) proclaims *A New Approach to Teaching Art, Religion, Philosophy, Literature and History.* The text itself reads that six fields (including music) "are often referred to collectively as 'the humanities' " (p. xii), that these six fields "involve similar problems, and the reasons for offering an education in these six are largely the same. It therefore makes sense to consider them together as 'the humanities' " (p. xv). Music was inadvertently passed over in the subtitle; is it dispensable in the text? How do we know if two fields' problems are similar? Only by Kaufmann telling us. The most explicit criterion mentioned for including a field in the humanities is the frequency of collective reference. Here the price of concision is clarity and a sense of origins; Kaufmann seems determined to sacrifice both in appealing to the reader's good faith.

The reasons for teaching the humanities, we are told, are at least four: preserving the great works of humanity, promoting the consideration of alternative human goals, improving perception of and sensitivity to alternatives, and fostering a critical spirit. Although these reasons are sensible enough, even admirable, their origins are obscure. And again, why "at least" four reasons when only four are given and no others are hinted at? My impression is that Kaufmann is fully aware of the kind of objections I have raised but persists in spite of them. The reader is invited to be as indulgent as the author is self-indulgent.

"Four Kinds of Minds" introduces a classification of human types that figure in the study and teaching of the humanities. There are "visionaries," those who make sustained efforts to articulate a distinctive view of the world, and "scholastics," who, lacking a distinctive vision, rely on consensus. "Socratic" types probe the faith and morals of the age, and "journalists" write for instant consumption. Kaufmann sees these four types as alternative role models for academics and argues that the Socratic type is a real alternative to the scholastic, with the visionary unfortunately rare and the journalist relegated to the newsroom. This chapter is particularly entertaining, with Blake, Freud, Goya, Kant, Toynbee, and others classified according to dominant and subdominant type. Edmund Wilson, for example, is part visionary but is made out to be hopelessly mired in the journalistic

ethos. At one point Kaufmann tries to show how carelessly Wilson had read Sophocles' *Philoctetes* to which the title essay of *The Wound and the Bow* alludes, but succeeds only in showing how he has misread Wilson. One can hardly resist fitting Kaufmann rather unflatteringly into his own scheme.

"The Art of Reading" a classic text in the humanities distinguishes four major approaches: the exegetical, in which the reader's attitude toward the author suggests that "we don't know and he does"; the dogmatic, where "we know and he doesn't"; the agnostic, presupposing that "we don't know and suspend judgment about truth"; and the dialectical attitude, characteristic of the way texts ought to be read, assuming that "we don't know everything and he doesn't; but we have some intelligence and he does; and we shall try to transcend some errors by engaging in a common quest, confronting the voice of the text as a You" (the author's distinctive voice and meaning). In 24 pages, Kaufmann effectively elaborates dialectical reading in what amounts to a contribution to theory of interpretation. This chapter should not be glossed over as another How to Read a Book.

An accomplished author, translator, and editor, Kaufmann draws extensively on his considerable experience in "The Politics of Reviewing and the Ethics of Translating and Editing" humanistic texts, primarily to censure those reviewers, translators, and editors (most of whom are journalists and scholastics) who fail to promote the conservation and cultivation of the best humanistic works.

Comparative religion is touted in "The Place of Religion in Higher Education" as an ideal opportunity for culture shock that Socratic teachers and dialectical readers need—the chance to confront historical perspectives and variant cultures, faiths, and morals. Kaufmann stops just short of a lesson plan in outlining courses that draw on materials from the sacred texts of Western and Oriental religions with a 16-page detail of how the Book of Genesis might be taught. Comparative religion turns out to be interdisciplinary work par excellence, crossing departmental boundaries between literature, art, history, music, and philosophy.

"Vision Can Be Taught, But . . . " not without discipline and not without careful attention to the goals spelled out in the prologue. Chapter 5 contrasts discipline (as rigorous self-discipline and learning one thing well) to both the short-sighted anti-specialization of the pre–World War II "age of the teacups" and the microscopic scholasticism of the "age of specialization" that followed. The humanistic disciplines are described as uniquely capable of achieving humanistic goals, especially as they supply alternative visions of culture. Even the

visionary is subject to a disciplined mastery of techniques and to the confrontation of alternative visions if he is to articulate his own successfully.

The final chapter, referring to the present as the dawn of "The Interdisciplinary Age," defends the discipline of interdisciplinary work. Pointing out pitfalls as well as virtues, Kaufmann discusses survey courses in literature, art history, and more particularly, philosophy. Anticipating the charge of superficiality, he requires competence in at least two fields or departments in order to engage in "serious" interdisciplinary work and cites examples of problems and issues for which such work is indispensable—punishment, death, and the field of bioethics. Here any discipline that illuminates the subject in question ought to be consulted, for instance, medicine or law, and the question, what are the humanities? seems less cogent than, what is a humanistic problem? Kaufmann calls for the establishment of interdisciplinary centers and new interdisciplinary journals that would address such problems, transcend narrow departmental concerns, and promise a vigorous future for the humanities.

Some readers may balk at Kaufmann's penchant for classification: four reasons for teaching the humanities, four kinds of minds, four ways to read a classic, five types of reviewers, three ages in the twentieth century. Although he seems to view himself as a prophet crying in the wilderness, there is really very little new here as far as the purposes and functions of the humanities are concerned. Traditional values are reaffirmed. Where he clearly intends to break new ground he does not always succeed—suggesting, for example, that the time has come to seriously plan for establishing interdisciplinary centers, when such centers already exist (at Chicago, Southern California, Yale).

What is new and bracing, if not refreshing, is the easy and irreverent erudition with which Kaufmann challenges the academic establishment. His deliberately polemical vision is directed at the culprits who have been responsible for the current "sad condition" of the humanities. Is it likely that scholastics will repent?

Note

1. Walter Kaufmann is professor of philosophy at Princeton University. A list of his books fills a page in the preliminaries of the volume under review. He is perhaps best known for the highly regarded *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975) and his Nietzsche translations.