men retained the proceeds from the sale of rice. In a study on smallholder planting in Ivory Coast, it was indicated, on the basis of past experience, that

"the marketable surplus of food and hence the income from it—which is usually retained by the women—is likely to decrease. The proceeds from the sale of the rubber are likely to be retained by the men..."

Greater distance to plots used for subsistence farming means that not only women with families to feed were affected, but that their daughters, too, are needed to maintain food supplies. This suggests that female children would not receive the same opportunities for education, or other training, limited as they may be.

While it may be difficult to put a cash value on the loss of real income for female members of the family, there is no doubt that the true cost of cash crop production is greatly underestimated.

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THE PRODUCTION of cash crops has greatly raised the incomes and living standards of Africans. If this were not so they would not have cultivated these crops, or would have soon abandoned them and reverted to subsistence cultivation. This simple general point is confirmed by ample evidence, such as the large-scale expansion in the import or local production of mass consumer goods, the great increase in government revenues, and the spectacular decline in mortality.

The distribution of the material benefits within the family is a different issue, which was not discussed by either Professor Mazrui or myself. But as the mortality of women and children has fallen greatly in the wake of the cultivation of cash crops in Africa, and as many of the consumer goods are used by women, it is safe to say that they too have benefited greatly from the emergence of cash crops.

P. T. BAUER

**Kaufmann's “Martin Buber”**

WALTER KAUFMANN'S assessment of Martin Buber's triumphs and failures in ENCOUNTER (May 1979) is a tour de force executed in the grand manner, which sets Buber in the context of some of the most important philosophers, poets, and psychoanalysts of the 19th and 20th centuries. For all its erudition, there is very little solid coming-to-terms with Buber himself and its central theses are shockingly wide of the mark. The heart of Kaufmann's article is the assertion that Buber's claim as a philosopher stands and falls on I and Thou, and that I and Thou is "seriously flawed" in its style, in its authenticity, and, above all, in the Manichean dualism it postulates between the I-Thou and the I-It relations.

Kaufmann's critique of the style of I and Thou is curious, considering that he wrote a 40-page prologue for his translation of I and Thou in a pseudo-I and Thou style and format! More serious, it is totally misleading in the impression it gives that I and Thou was not revised by Buber at the time; for Buber went over it critically many times before publishing it. Kaufmann to the contrary notwithstanding, I and Thou is not a book of the "easy word" but of the "hard word." The road from the easy word to the hard one was for Buber a road from "speaking beautifully" to rejecting any expression not fully mastered by intention and devotion to the word.

"There is a Manichean strain in I and Thou that is unworthy of Buber", writes Kaufmann, "and he himself might have eliminated it if he had been more severe with the child of his inspiration."

It was precisely the attack on Manichean dualism that lies at the heart of I and Thou as of all Buber's mature writings. The whole of I and Thou is concerned with bringing ever-greater realms of the It into the world of the Thou so that the latter wins "a shining streaming constancy."

Buber did not mean (as Kaufmann assumes) that when I think about a person nothing of the Thou remains—only that in so far as the beloved is talked about, I must put her or him into categories (such as height, colour of hair, and sex). These very details, so far from being an obstacle to the Thou, are taken up in their particularity and concreteness when I turn back to my friend or beloved as a person.

When I once pointed out to Kaufmann (after his lecture at the Buber Centennial in Israel) that Buber saw his life-work precisely as the attack on the Manicheanism prevalent in our time, Kaufmann responded, "I wanted to say that there must be something wrong with a man like that..." This non sequitur hinted at a personal back­wardness which we might well be totally baffled by such a gross misunderstanding of the heart of I and Thou by its official translator. In November 1958 Kaufmann sent Buber a long letter in which he expressed his disappointment in Buber's earlier letter in response to Kaufmann's Critique of Religion and Philosophy.

"How many persons are there in my generation whom a few words from you about what they are trying to do and doing could help so much as me? When I ask you questions 'on the knees of my heart' and you reply that you lack time to answer, how can I see it as anything else than a rejection?" (my translation from the German in Buber Briefwechsel III, 405).

As Buber's son Rafael himself told me, Kaufmann's whole ambivalent attitude toward Buber from then on stems from this disappointment.

By naming I and Thou as a cornerstone of Buber's philosophy and attacking it, Kaufmann wishes to dismiss the significance of Buber's philosophy of dialogue as a whole, reserving his praise for Buber's translation of the Bible and his telling of Hasidic tales. But a true assessment of the significance of Buber's philosophy is not possible unless I and Thou is taken together with all the
books that in one way or another stem from it: Between Man and Man, Good and Evil, Eclipse of God, The Knowledge of Man, and much of Pointing the Way and A Believing Humanism: Gleanings. This whole series represents Buber’s developing philosophical anthropology, his understanding of the totality and uniqueness of the human, as it also represents Buber’s application of his philosophy of dialogue to theory of knowledge, psychology, education, ethics, aesthetics, social philosophy and the philosophy of religion.

Buber’s teaching of “personal making present” “inclusion” and “confirmation” is of the greatest importance for his philosophy of dialogue in general and for its application to family life, education, and psychotherapy in particular. Yet it is only in Between Man and Man and The Knowledge of Man, not in I and Thou, that it is developed. The Knowledge of Man stands, indeed, as the culmination and crown of Buber’s theory of knowledge, his philosophical anthropology, and his ontology. Along with his misunderstanding of the dialectic between I-Thou and I-It, Walter Kaufmann’s serious mismeaning with Martin Buber is his failure to bring Buber’s philosophical anthropology into his assessment of Buber as a philosopher.

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MAURICE FRIEDMAN’S LETTER is ill designed to teach us anything about dialogue. It is an example of psychohistory at its worst.

(1) He reads carelessly but claims to fathom my wishes: “Kaufmann wishes to dismiss the significance of Buber’s philosophy of dialogue as a whole, reserving his low for Buber’s translation of the Bible and his telling of Hasidic tales.”

In fact, I did not praise his translation and I have no wish whatsoever to dismiss his ideas about dialogue. It is precisely his notion of dialogue that keeps haunting me, although I am dissatisfied with the way Buber worked it out philosophically. He tended to rely far too much on intense feeling while disparaging reason, and he often failed to note how this invited illusions rather than genuine dialogue. The examples he gives of I-You relationships, not only in I and Thou but also in his later works, illustrate this danger: Buber’s relation to a tree or to a person glimpsed across a room, without the exchange of a single word. His very short Hasidic tales are masterpieces to my mind but also illustrate the same danger: the genuine You of the Hasidic masters is not recognised and Buber does not enter into a genuine dialogue with them. He relies so much on his own intense feelings that the resulting portrait of Hasidism is extremely subjective. People like those he creates in his wonderful stories never existed.

It is Buber’s theory of translation, worked out in dialogue with Franz Rosenzweig, that merits the highest praise and seems much more important to me than either their translation of the Bible or Rosenzweig’s translations of Judah Halevi. Here I find an unequivocal insistence on the imperative that the translator must listen to the distinctive voice of someone else and make himself the mouthpiece of the You, allowing the author to address readers who have no other way of hearing him.

Professor Friedman and others may find this small praise, and he, like many other translators, has never learned this lesson. Yet translation is merely one form of reading and interpretation, and what Buber said about translation carries over into these fields and indeed into our relation to other human beings. It is for this reason that I have included Buber among the nine major figures with whom I deal at length in my trilogy, Discovering the Mind (1980). I realise that my lecture, printed in ENCURRER, was anything but the last word on the subject; and since I delivered it I have done a lot more work on these questions, trying to get things clearer.

(2) Friedman’s “translation from the German” of a snippet from one of my published letters to Buber is shockingly inaccurate.

(3) To discover the reasons for my alleged wish to dismiss what in fact I am not dismissing, Friedman relies on his recollection of two conversations, one with me, the other with Rafael Buber. The remark he ascribes to me (I do not recall, and in any case it remains totally unclear what it could have meant in context. What I do recall is that after hearing the second version of my lecture in New York in February 1978, Friedman told me that this time he liked it even better than in Israel the month before. What Rafael Buber may have said to Friedman about me, I do not know; but he was in no position to know much about my attitude toward Martin Buber before 1969. Rafael and I had never met before he came to Princeton in 1960 to ask me to make a new translation of I and Thou. I told him, as I had also told Martin Buber long before November 1958, that I had mixed feelings about I and Thou. I also suggested that he ask Maurice Friedman to translate the book. But I shall not descend to the level of reporting what Rafael Buber said to me about Friedman.

While I regret the uncharacteristic ad hominem character of Friedman’s letter, I am grateful for the opportunity he has given me to clear up some misunderstandings.

ONE FINAL REMARK. My so-called “ambivalent attitude toward Buber” does not spring from any disappointment. Unlike Friedman, I am obviously not a disciple, and in her long introduction to the first volume of her edition of Buber’s Briefwechsel, Grete Schaefer has analysed my relationship to Buber at length with really extraordinary sensitivity. Is my attitude toward Nietzsche or Hegel “ambivalent” and in need of psychological explanations? Many scholars will surely agree with me that it is possible to admire a philosopher in many ways while at the same time disagreeing with him on very important matters. And I have learned from Nietzsche rather than Buber that precisely this stance facilitates genuine dialogue.

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Yalta

READERS of Nikolai Tolstoy’s arresting article on the Victims of Yalta in the June issue of ENCOUNTER will be interested to know that conditional planning permission has been granted for a memorial fountain to be put up in...