

bzw. literaturwissenschaftlicher Kategorisierung" (p. 14) bewahrt. Auch ist ihm, der es als vermessen erkennt, "ein wirklich vollständiges Porträt der lyrischen 'Ökoszene' zu präsentieren" (p. 7) zu bestätigen, daß er ein hohes Maß des Möglichen erreicht hat. Der Band dient uns als Warnung und Mahnung.

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V. INTELLECTUAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY

KAUFMANN, WALTER, *Discovering the Mind. Freud versus Adler and Jung*. New York: McGraw-Hill (1980). 494 pp.

Volume III of *Discovering the Mind* represents the capstone to a trilogy of works as well as to the entire oeuvre of the prolific and widely read Walter Kaufmann, who died in September 1980. Characteristic of everything he wrote as a translator or scholar was a sensitive awareness of language, particularly of the pitfalls of writing in English about German texts. In this volume on *Freud versus Adler and Jung*, he suggests that the translation of the central psychoanalytical terms *das Ich*, *das Es*, and *das Über-Ich* into the Latinate forms of ego, id, and superego has added to the erroneous image of psychoanalysis as a "hard" science, a point recently made by Bruno Bettelheim as well. Kaufmann considers such translations a source of misunderstanding of what he calls Freud's "poetic science." Predictably, he dismisses Frank Sulloway's recent attempt to depict Freud as a "crypto-biologist" (*Freud, Biologist of the Mind: Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend*, 1979) as the perpetuation of a misleading half-truth. For Kaufmann, Freud stands neither in the materialist tradition of nineteenth-century science nor in the dualistic philosophical tradition of Kant and Hegel, but represents the culmination of a line from Goethe and Nietzsche, fusing "the sensitivity of a poet with the rigor and self-discipline of a scientist" (p. 109).

Freud does well by Kaufmann, clearly too well. The central focuses of the volume are his breaks with Alfred Adler and C. G. Jung, and, as the title implies, the central tone is polemical. Adler and Jung fare poorly as the once favored sons whose oedipal ambitions and character weaknesses played a far greater role than theoretical differences in the split with their Olympian "father" figure. Particularly in Jung's case with the help of the Freud/Jung correspondence, Kaufmann persuasively draws the outlines of the younger man's wish for rejection. Yet lines drawn so unequivocally and blame placed so emphatically invariably invite contradiction. Long before Kaufmann reaches the point of opposing Jung's "sick soul" to Freud as "the very image of nobility" (p. 395), his method of argumentation has reached the point of being counterproductive.

Goethe's dictum that "Man is his deeds" serves Kaufmann as the justification for the extent to which he compares the behavior and actions of his protagonists. His estimation of Freud's contribution to the twentieth-century mind rests substantially on his estimation of him as "an exemplary human being" (p. 167). Yet it has become a commonplace of intellectual history that great thinkers and poets are not always—or even usually—models of human action. Moreover, it is increasingly becoming a commonplace in intellectual history that the achievements of Sigmund Freud are as immune from the attacks of detractors as they are from the praise of everly zealous advocates.

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