

Implikationen von Nietzsches Elitismus werden im letzten Teilstück des Essays abgehandelt ("Nietzsche über die Vornehmen und die Vornehmheit"). Im Mittelstück, "Nietzsches Kampf mit dem romantischen Pessimismus," bemüht sich Heller darzulegen, wie Nietzsche versucht, die in der ausklingenden Romantik enthaltene Gefahr des "Nihilismus" in die "dionysische Allbejahung des schöpferischen und zerstörerischen spielenden Weltkinds" (193) unzuwandeln.

Der letzte Essay, "Zum Thema Psychoanalyse und Germanistik: Gedanken zu Freuds Interpretation von Jensens 'Gradiva'," ist eine persönliche Auseinandersetzung mit der Psychoanalyse, in der gezeigt wird, wie Freuds Interpretation einer eher kitschigen Novelle eines populären Vielschreibers des Psychologen eigene Komplexe widerspiegelt, was hinwiederum zu der Versuchung führt, auch beim Interpretieren von Freuds Auslegung der Novelle nach psychologischen *hang-ups* zu schnüffeln. Fazit: die angebliche Objektivität psychoanalytischer Interpretation ist verkappte Subjektivität, und die psychoanalytisch bedingte Literaturkritik verleitet dazu, den Ursprung alles Schöpferischen auf pathologische Komplexe zurückzuführen. Heller scheint dabei zu übersehen, daß seine eigene Interpretation von Goethes "Nachtlied" einem psychoanalytischen Reduktionismus gefährlich nahe kommt.

Im Vorwort bemerkt der Autor, daß es ihm beim Verfassen dieser Arbeiten darum ging, die ungelösten geistigen Aufgaben unseres Zeitalters zu veranschaulichen, ohne sich u.a. in "labyrinthisch sich bespiegelnder Reflexion" (6) zu ergehen. Aber ironischerweise vereitelt gerade der labyrinthische Stil, in der sich seine ungezügeltere Beredtsamkeit ergießt, diese lobenswerte Absicht. Zu schade, denn vielerorts führt er uns auf subtile, noch kaum begangene Gedankenwege. Fast ist man versucht, von "Love's Labour's Lost" zu sprechen.

*University of Utah*

—Robert E. Helbling

### **Discovering the Mind: Goethe, Kant, and Hegel.**

*By Walter Kaufmann. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980. 288 pages. \$ 14.95.*

This volume is the first in a trilogy by the late Professor Kaufmann, dealing with attempts by nine thinkers to understand the human mind. Volume II, which has appeared, concentrates on Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Buber; the final volume, announced for 1981, will be titled *Freud versus Adler and Jung*. Volume I can be read by itself, although it points forward to both positive and negative developments to be covered in succeeding volumes. Kaufmann calls the discovery of mind a "story" (5) and provides numerous hints for his readers that the plot will thicken with the advent of Nietzsche. Indeed, Volume I ends without closure, on an account of Hegel's failure to create a synthesis between Kant's thought and Goethe's; this lack of resolution is meant to impel the reader to the sequel. But since Kaufmann's attempt is also to discuss in detail the individual characters of his story, the lack of closure need not bother readers of this volume.

Kaufmann's aim is both diachronic and synchronic. He wants to show stages in the process of discovering "the mind" and to give a specific psychological portrait of each contributor to (or in Kant's case, detractor from) this process, so that ideas about the mind are presented together with the personalities that generated them.

Kaufmann has a broad understanding of the term "mind," which he defines as "feeling and intelligence, reason and emotion, perception and will, thought and the

unconscious" (4). He also views mind as something which develops over time, is subject to history, and ought to see itself as free and self-determining. He evaluates thinkers positively to the extent they take these aspects of mind into account and to the extent they also value or exemplify the autonomous personality. Thus Goethe is Kaufmann's point of departure and the protagonist of his story, as Kant is his antagonist.

Goethe's exemplary function is due in equal parts to his writings and his personality. In his works (pre-eminently *Faust* and the *Farbenlehre*) he stresses development, opposes essentialism, and advocates a non-Newtonian, "poetic" science; his life gives a model of the autonomous personality. Moreover, his style and his thought are paradigms of clarity for Kaufmann. Kant is a negative example on every point. He is called a "disaster" (5) and is excoriated for his obscurantism, his pretense of rigor, his model of the mind which ignores development, and his personal rigidity. Hegel recapitulates some of the favorable aspects of Goethe, especially his emphasis on the importance of development and the historicity of ideas. But he also falls into the trap of academic philosophy: he affects rigor where there is none, as Kant did, and from the same psychological motive. Both Kant and Hegel insist on the need for certainty and absolute knowledge because of their own insecurity and fear of uncertainty.

This book is intended for a general audience; all the thinkers are carefully introduced and situated in time and place, and all citations are in English. (The German is provided in a few instances only, with no apparent system. For instance, a passage from Schopenhauer, which bears only peripherally on the argument, is also given in German, but the *Faust* passages are not.) I welcome the presentation of Goethe to an English-speaking audience; this may be the first such popular study of Goethe since Friedenthal's biography. Kaufmann is very convincing in describing and documenting Goethe's contributions to the thought of his contemporaries and successors. It may even be salutary to have someone point out the shortcomings of Kant and Hegel from the perspective of their cultural influence. Kaufmann's book is avowedly polemical in nature, so one misses his point if one faults him for one-sidedness in his treatment of Kant and Hegel. There are, however, two real problems with this work.

First, Kaufmann's positive bias toward Goethe leads him to an uncritical position with regard to Goethe's autonomy. Goethe appears as a *primum mobile*; social, psychological, and literary forces are given very little credit for shaping him. This yields a modified version of Goethe the Olympian. In contrast, the "psychogram" of Kant explains so much of his thought in terms of experiential causes that Kaufmann verges on an *ad hominem* dismissal of Kant's arguments. Kaufmann is very open about his bias, but a more equitable treatment of the two men would have been in order.

Second, Kaufmann cites liberally from *Faust* (usually Mephisto's words) to represent Goethe's thought. I was uncomfortable that he did not distinguish the evidential value of statements in a poetic work from those in a work like the First Critique. But the whole thrust of the book is to point out the superior insight of the creative artist into areas of experience untouched by the academic philosophers. As he states "those who would discover the mind cannot afford to ignore poetry and art" (269).

University of California-Irvine

—Ruth Crowley